the ALTERNATIVE: AN AMERICAN SPECTATOR

The Amazing Grace of C. S. Lewis
by Terry Eastland

Liberal Democracy
by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.

Mulligan Stew
by Max Geltman

Rethinking Crime
by James Q. Wilson

The Locust Years
by R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

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The Continuing Crisis

■ April brought a further discrediting to the once warmly debated domino theory. In fact, so discredited has the domino theory become that hardly a dove can be found to discuss the issue. Indeed, hardly a dove can be found to discuss any aspect of Southeast Asia. For that matter, the unusual quiet which befell Capitol Hill as the news of Southeast Asia worsened was about the only pleasant news during the month. Actually, April might have seen the public discourse assume a dignity it has not had for over a decade, if only our journalists were as cowardly as our politicians. Unfortunately the journalists did not follow the politicians into hiding, and America was soon awash in an idiotic spate of lurid headlines celebrating what the journalists seemed to consider America's international abasement during the surrender of Cambodia and South Vietnam—this after Congress did everything humanly possible to insure that no other outcome was possible.

■ The discredited domino theory, originally propounded by President Eisenhower, elucidated the naive view that were one Southeast Asian country to fall to Communist aggressors other coterminous nations would tumble "like a row of dominoes." The pedagogues, armed with syllogisms and superior erudition, made short shrift of it, and by the early seventies it had slipped into the *New York Times Style Book* as the "discredited-domino-theory." But—though the pedagogues can work prodigies in their seminars—nothing so expediently discredits theory as practice, and it took Communist armies merely six weeks to expose the theory for the absurdity that it is.

■ First they marched upon South Vietnam's central highlands. Then they tightened the noose around Cambodia's capital. On April 17 Cambodia fell; about two-thirds of South Vietnam tumbled. War suddenly broke out in Laos, and on the day before South Vietnam was surrendered to the Communists by perhaps the fattest general in South Vietnam, the *New York Times* reported the recrudescence of war in Thailand. By the end of the month Australia was reviewing its defense capability as Lieutenant General Sir Mervyn Brogan stated that he saw a "subversive threat to Indonesia and ourselves." Thailand's Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan denounced the United States as a country "without morals," declaring that all American troops would be expelled from Thailand within a year, while his government waxed lovey-dovey toward the Communist governments of Cambodia and South Vietnam and the Philippines began reviewing its policy *vis-à-vis* the United States. Finally, on May 2 North Vietnam ordered the United States out of South Korea, and South Korea began a review of its national security policies. And so a chorus of Bronx cheers for the domino theory as it hunkers down the corridors of history along with such other laughingstocks as "containment," "balanced budgets," and the "Copernican theory."

■ Meanwhile, Chadologists in the State Department say it is still too early to predict the future orientation of that volatile African nation, but the political career of Chad's erstwhile president, Mr. Ngarta Tombalbaye, is definitely on the wane. Mr. Tombalbaye was shot dead when Chad army forces stormed his palace in Ndjamena, killing 16 members of the palace guard, 12 chickens, and the presidential oxen. Chad is now governed by a General Noel Odingar, one of that progressive republic's first disc jockeys. From Kampala in scenic Uganda comes word that the government has rounded up a large number of businessmen and flogged them at government expense for hoarding beetle wine. And the doctrine of the people's right to know received a notable boost when that country's four daily newspapers published nude photographs of former foreign minister, Miss Elizabeth Bagaaya.

■ In England the possible dangers of excessive humor on television will be investigated by a Royal Commission in the melancholy aftermath of the death of Mr. Alexander Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell, a King's Lynn bricklayer, was seized by a fit of uncontrollable laughter while watching the comedy show, "Goodies," and died after 25 minutes of fatal hilarity. Despite his tragic passing, his spouse, Nessie, is writing the program's producers to "thank them for making Alex's last minutes so happy." Violence continues to stalk the land of the free. Addressing a Vanderbilt University audience, Mr. William Kunstler, the modern Darrow, had no sooner asserted that "American students have no spirit left" than an American student, armed with an American-made chocolate cream pie, launched it into Mr. Kunstler's face. "Come here, you coward," yelled the engooed Mr. Kunstler, as he picked himself up from beneath the creamy debris. But the assailant made good his escape, and Mr. Kunstler was left to ponder the diabolical lengths to which the CIA will go to wipe out vestiges of American civil liberties. And in Philadelphia Mr. James Stackhouse set fire to his landlord, Mr. Arnold Cooper, for killing Stackhouse's cat. The pet suffocated when the loutish Mr. Cooper rolled over on it during his afternoon nap.

■ On April 17 ex-Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, was acquitted of bribery charges, and Mayor Richard J. Daley, the traditional mayor of Chicago, scotched newspaper reports that his son was about to marry a princess of a local mafioso by declaring that Miss Mary Lou (Pretzels and Beer) Briatta "is a good Catholic, college-educated girl, who paints and plays the flu." In Weston, Massachusetts, the most popular Presidential candidate in the United States was driven from a speakers' dais by a mob of disgruntled citizens led by a gaunt, humorless woman who continually jabbed him with "a tiny American flag on a stick." "You can label this jostling," smiled the popular Senator as he galloped along in front of the enraged mob.

■ Despite the fact that America's social revolution is finally bearing fruit, the foul spirit of enterprise still permeates American life and occasionally intrudes where it is least expected. Consider that $3,750,000 fund that the government forced the Bank of America to establish in order to redress sexual inequalities and to train women for higher-level jobs. "Flabbergasted" is how federal judge Charles B. Renfrew described his feelings when he discovered that the fund's female directors had used it to send female friends on world junkets whose rationales had a queer ring to them. One woman went to Europe to learn how to cook because she "liked to give dinner parties and wanted expertise in fine wines and foods." Another lady went on a tour of Colonial America with stops at some of the most elegant fashion spots in Washington and New York.

■ It was reported that Miss Elizabeth Taylor has amoebic dysentery. President Ford continues to sweat it out. On April 23 he warned of the increasing power of the Soviet navy, just as that navy entered upon a world-wide maneuver, its most extensive naval exercise since World War II and an exercise almost wholly neglected by the American press. At Yale he delivered a remarkably intelligent speech on law and order, which caused visible alarm amongst the students and apparently induced sleep in the press box. And in response to the last sepulchral events of Southeast Asia he delivered several speeches, which Christian charity enjoins us not to dwell upon other than to mention that, just as he generously joined his Democratic colleagues in a plea against blaming others for the collapse, Speaker of the House Carl Albert notified a Democratic fundraising dinner that it was the Democrats who brought an end to war in Southeast Asia. His inherent delicacy restrained him from explaining how this feat was accomplished.

■ At the end of the month *Newsweek* reported that a "massive bloodbath" was reforming Cambodia. From Vietnam some one hundred thousand refugees straggled into America, setting off an annoying chorus of yelps from Americans who feared their jobs would be jeopardized by this mélange of immigrants—mostly doctors, lawyers, civil engineers, intellectuals, and prostitutes. But if things went awry for the American government, consider the miseries of the left-wing military government of Portugal. First they attempted to show their revolutionary solidarity with the progressive peoples of the world by returning the three-hundred-year-old Portuguese colony of Macao to Red China. The Chinese refused it. Then they set up an election tilted so as to give a large vote to the Communists or to assure a large number of blank votes. The Communists mustered only 12% and the blanks did worse. And finally the Communists and Socialists combined to make their May Day celebration such an embarrassment that some observers suspected that their ranks had been infiltrated by the American Democratic Party. —*RET*

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Editorial/R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

Once Again, The Locust Years

Around the middle of the 1960s a critique of American society surfaced, arguing to the effect that American foreign policy was causing intense discomfiture amongst the better sorts of Americanoes, and that if that policy were not radically revised American society would be overcome by a great pother. Well, that policy was not radically revised, American society has been overcome by a considerable pother, and what makes the above reflections verge upon the wry is that those people who raised this critique, replete with shocking vaticinations, were for the most part the same people who caused the pother. Nonetheless, what is positively perverse is that those who raised this critique were, in many respects, responsible for the policy. After all, if progressive liberals were not responsible for internationalism, who was? If it was not progressive liberals who harangued that theme of isolationism which they spied in the policies of a continuum of men from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to Senator Robert A. Taft, Sr., then who did?

What the middle 1960s witnessed was—among other things—the outbreak of another of those civil wars which have periodically envenomed the disagreements of American liberals during this century. The last such row was won by the anti-Communist internationalists who routed the forces of Henry Wallace, the Progressive Citizens of America, and other assorted strummers-of-harps in the late 1940s. But by the middle 1960s, though still lusting for the scepter, many of the anti-Communist internationalists had wearied of the burdens of power, and when the strummers-of-harps again aspired to control American liberalism many of these anti-Communists capitulated. Those who did not were left without a country. In the immediate aftermath of this civil war many things remain unclear, and we still have no sure idea of how the victors will rewrite their official version of American history. I cannot say with certitude that Taft will remain a benighted provincial or that President Eisenhower will remain an amiable slug. I am not even certain that President Kennedy will remain the earthly vessel of Divine wisdom. What I am certain of is that the next official version will not speak of "containment," "anti-Communism," and "internationalism" as the unlimited glories of yore. Most likely they will be presented as conceptually alluring policies, mysteriously subverted by The Coca Cola Export Corporation and other foreign subsidiaries of the Robber Barons.

What has made this civil war so discommoding is that the policies being criticized in the middle 1960s were policies issuing from the postwar genius of the American people, a genius that liberals had meticulously shaped, and a genius that really believed in the Four Freedoms, the Truman Doctrine, and John F. Kennedy's inaugural address. And because it was the genius of a people matured by the lessons of appeasement, annealed by a great world war, and tested continually during the postwar period, the reversal of these policies could not be an easy matter. Even though the critics of these policies held the redoubts of great influence, there was still bound to be a messy period of national pother, the very existence of which—for it was prophesied by the critics—lent plausibility to their noble work. And so, as the postwar foreign policy consensus withers under the bombardment of its critics, we find ourselves struggling through this momentous present, a sad time of American ignominy and inaction, a time in which we are forced once again to address those timeless questions democracies always face when the world feels the ghostly fevers of war. That we have to grope for the answers but forty years after the answers imposed themselves on the European democracies is cause for a tremor of fatalism demanding a surge of resolution.

One of these questions concerns the way democracies establish their foreign policies, or as the question is posed today: "Is that bipartisanship in foreign policy, which our postwar consensus sustained, a good thing?" Arthur Schlesinger, an eternal partisan of anemophilous liberalism, would say no. Indeed he has recently dismissed the whole idea of bipartisan foreign policy as a Cold War aberration, often impolitic, often wrongheaded, and out of cadence with twentieth-century American experience. I, screwing up my courage before this formidable sage who before the 1972 election notified *New York Times Magazine* readers of Senator George McGovern's impending victory, would say yes; and I would pause to wonder at how Mr. Schlesinger has changed his formerly glum estimate of diplomacy during the 1920s and 1930s—fallow years for American foreign policy and years visited by not a bud of bipartisanship in Congress. Evidently Mr. Schlesinger now applauds the achievements of such worthies as Senator Homer T. Bone in stultifying Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt.

To understand the inconsistencies of Mr. Schlesinger one must understand that he is the kind of partisan ideologue who takes his own views with the most revered seriousness while dismissing opponents as either unserious or nonexistent. For instance, Mr. Schlesinger and his crowd now claim that bipartisanship was easily possible at the outset of the Cold War because there existed no serious opposition to President Truman's foreign policy, a foreign policy they supported. Today they pronounce bipartisanship impossible because of their profound moral objections. In the first instance they simply ignore the existence of the Taft Republicans. In the second instance Mr. Schlesinger and his fellows accord their own notions the kind of seriousness characteristic of the religious fanatic. Future historians, I suspect, will note that a certain kind of liberal at work during the 1960s saved religious fundamentalism in America by injecting it into the godless world of American politics.

In suggesting there should be a broad bipartisanship in foreign policy I am not being anti-democratic or "imperialist." Serious persons, including Mr. Schlesinger in his more sensible moments, have long considered bipartisanship a desideratum of great importance to democratic governments. Edward Hallett Carr reminds us that, before the First World War, "In democratic countries, foreign policy was traditionally regarded as outside the scope of party politics...." Foreign policies are not brought to bear on problems resting within one's own jurisdiction, but they are nudged out into the treacherous world of foreign jurisdictions. In such wilds one must proceed cautiously and knowledgeably. The bombast of domestic politics is not taken so philosophically by foreigners. Foreign policy legislation must be more purposive than the gallimaufry bills thrown together for domestic consumption. Few wars are fought over blowzy farm subsidies; one cannot speak so lightly about foreign trade legislation or neutrality laws. These policies are sent into a world over which we have less control and in which miscalculations bring on something more unpleasant than electoral upsets. They bring on wars, which is why foreign policy cannot be kicked around the Senate like so much domestic legislation. This is not to say that foreign policy should not be subject to thoughtful debate, but the debate must not proceed with the abandon that characterizes so many of our political shouting matches. Senators and Congressmen should possess a sense of deference for the complicated conditions of international life, the historical framework that is so much a part of communication amongst nations, and the sensibilities of their own citizens. All of these considerations have been ignored in recent years both by many American politicians and by almost all critics of American policy.

By ignoring these considerations, foreign policy critics have ignored one of the inescapable elements in the formulation of democratic foreign policy, namely the

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Special Book Review/Terry Eastland

The Amazing Grace of C. S. Lewis

Despite his death in 1963, Clive Staples Lewis remains the most widely read Oxford don of this century. His books, which now total 51, display a variety of genres: literary criticism, cultural history, popular theology, metaphysical fantasy, science fiction, children's stories, poetry, and even good old hard-nosed polemic. Of these works, Lewis' best known have been *The Screwtape Letters*, which landed him on the cover of *Time* magazine, *Mere Christianity*, a brief but solid apologetic for the Christian faith, and the *Chronicles of Narnia*, which are becoming, in their seven volumes, classics for children.

So much for the sake of introduction. Those reading Lewis for the first time usually want just another of his books. And those who have never read him will wonder why veteran readers keep coming back for second and third helpings of the same book. Several answers are plausible: that Lewis was gifted with a lucid writing style; or that he constantly appealed to the imagination in the understanding of difficult philosophical and theological ideas; or that he was exceptionally learned, a generalist *par excellence*. All of these answers, of course, contain a trace of truth, but the overwhelming reason for Lewis' popularity has been his commitment to Christianity.

Lewis was a member of the Church of England and he maintained an unswerving faith in the traditional doctrines of Christianity, including original sin, heaven and hell, the resurrection of Christ, and even the Second Coming. But his appeal to so many readers was not owing to any ability to ladle portions of Christianity upon whichever genre was at hand. Christianity, for Lewis, was never something laid on or painted over any underlying substratum, be it a book, an activity, or a life. His own life, in fact, was permeated, or as Lewis said in a different context, "shot through" with the Christian faith, and his writings demonstrated this full coloration.

Certainly, then, one is aware of a uniquely Christian sensibility in the author of even such nonreligious books as a volume on sixteenth-century English literature; but no one reads Lewis in order to fathom his personality. Lewis would not object in the least if one were to say that most of his works are, in a word, authorless. In one of his first essays, "The Personal Heresy in Criticism,"

C.S. Lewis: A Biography

by Roger Lancelyn Green
and Walter Hooper
Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich
$6.95

Lewis wrote that poetry should be poetless, by which he meant that poetry should and can be judged on its own merits, quite apart from either the psyche of the poet or the events of the poet's life. Accordingly, Lewis continued: "The poet is not a man who asks me to look at him; he is a man who says look at that and points; the more I follow the pointing of his finger the less I can possibly see of him."

If Lewis, like the poet, was a man who asked others not to look at him but at those things to which he pointed, why the publication of a first of its kind: *C.S. Lewis: A Biography*? In addition to Lewis' disregard for biography or psychoanalysis in the employ of criticism, Lewis himself, an extremely modest man, considered his own life of little public interest. Indeed, it is difficult to see, on the surface, why the unveiling of a life spent 29 years as an Oxford fellow and nine years as a Cambridge professor would do the public any appreciable service.

To their credit, Lewis' first biographers, Roger Lancelyn Green and Walter Hooper, are aware of these difficulties, and from the start they refuse the temptations of employing biography or psychoanalysis for the sake of criticizing Lewis' works. Green and Hooper, moreover, intend to tell it straight: "What is needed is a framework of straightforward fact." In providing this framework Green and Hooper tacitly recognize that the sole justification for telling Lewis' story is for its own sake. And they are right to assume that many thousands of Lewis readers will read *C.S. Lewis: A Biography* for just that reason.

As much as I am in sympathy with the approach Green and Hooper have taken in this biography, I must enter the caveat that upon occasion the authors seem to be snared not by the temptation of abandoning facts for novel speculation, but rather by the temptation of selecting the less awkward facts about the life of Lewis. Admittedly, the criticism here is no better than conjecture, since it is not ventured with the "less awkward facts" in hand; but the criticism derives from the fact that displays of reverence by Green and Hooper are not uncommon in *C.S. Lewis*, and also from the fact that Green and Hooper gently discourage inquiry into a couple of the less comprehensible areas of Lewis' life.

If the authors have fallen to this temptation, their fall is quite understandable: they are, if anything, worshippers of C.S. Lewis. Green first met Lewis in 1938 and became a close friend and critic of his works. Hooper, the expatriate North Carolinian, assumed in 1963 Lewis' personal secretaryship, a position he holds to this day. If these close associations have pushed them to the point of genuflection before the memory of Lewis, the same intimacy has also, quite fortunately, yielded them access to mountains of documents, papers, and letters, the most monumental of which are the *Lewis Papers*. Typed single-spaced by Lewis' brother Warren, these unpublished papers concern the Lewis family from 1850 to 1930 and fill 3,565 pages in eleven volumes. With the help of such private

A Taste of the Writing of C. S. Lewis

Don't waste time trying to make him think that materialism is *true*! Make him think it is strong, or stark, or courageous—that it is the philosophy of the future. That's the sort of thing he cares about.... Teach him to call it 'real life' and don't let him ask what he means by 'real'.

—*The Screwtape Letters*

...it is plain that to fight against 'Temptation' is also to explore the inner world; and it is scarcely less plain that to do so is already to be on the verge of allegory. We cannot speak, perhaps we can hardly think, of an 'inner conflict' without a metaphor; and every metaphor is an allegory in little.

—*The Allegory of Love*

You must picture me alone in that room at Magdalen, night after night, feeling, whenever my mind lifted for a second from my work, the steady, unrelenting approach of Him whom I so earnestly desired not to meet. That which I greatly feared had come upon me. In the Trinity Term of 1929 I gave in, and admitted that God was God, and knelt and prayed.

—*Surprised by Joy*

"Supposing I told you I'd been in a place where animals can talk and where there are—er—enchantments and dragons—and—well, all sorts of things you have in fairy tales." Scrubb felt terribly awkward as he said this and got red in the face.

"How did you get there?" said Jill. She also felt curiously shy.

"The only way you can—by Magic," said Eustace almost in a whisper.

—*The Silver Chair*

sources, Green and Hooper glean the facts necessary to tell the story "as best we could."

They begin by covering thoroughly the landscape of Lewis' early years, which Lewis himself had sketched in his spiritual autobiography *Surprised by Joy*, and which constitute a genuine wonder when juxtaposed against the odds of anyone today receiving an equivalent upbringing. Born in Belfast, Ireland, in 1898, Lewis barely stuck his foot into the closing door of the nineteenth century, but even for this inch he must in later life have been thankful. Precocious (Lewis was writing fantasy when he was six), he entered a private school, Malvern, which ordinarily would have been conducive to the reflective life but which had begun already a slide into mediocrity. Lewis was soon discovered out of his element; his mates considered him a social bounder, and before one year had elapsed, young Lewis left Malvern for the house of a private tutor. Fifty years later Warren Lewis wrote: "The fact is that he should never have been sent to a private school at all. Already at fourteen his intelligence was such that he would have fitted in better among undergraduates than among schoolboys; and by his temperament he was bound to be a misfit, an object of suspicion within the collective-minded and standardizing system. He was lucky to leave Malvern before the power of this system had done him any lasting damage."

So shortly before his sixteenth birthday, Lewis traveled to a private tutor, William T. Kirkpatrick, who instructed him for the two and a half years before he matriculated at Oxford. Under Kirkpatrick Lewis learned a schedule, about which he later said with characteristic understatement: "Some boys would not have liked it. To me it was red beef and strong beer." Lewis breakfasted early and read the *Iliad* for several hours. He stopped for tea but then picked up a Latin text until lunch. He digested his food during a solitary walk in the woods before working with Kirkpatrick through the early evening. He ate dinner and then read and discussed English literature before tea and a deserved bed. To mix the fare, Lewis read Boswell, Herodotus, *Tristram Shandy*, the *Essays of Elia*, and Andrew Lang's *History of English Literature* during his daily teas. No woodshop, metalshop, typing, or gym for C.S. Lewis, "Jack," as he was called. No chance to become well-rounded and finely tuned to the world, after Kirkpatrick.

In the long run such neglects proved extraordinarily beneficial. Lewis often remarked that the Kirkpatrick days were the most formative and even the best. Hence, the transition to University College, Oxford, was smoothly accomplished. There Lewis achieved distinction with a Double First in Literae Humaniores, or "Greats," as it is called, a course demanding intimacy with classical Greek and Latin texts, philosophy, archeology, and history. Another First in English Literature and Language having been won in 1923, Lewis was well on his way towards becoming, as Austin Farrer once said, "the best read man any of us ever is likely to meet." After filling in at University College as an interim tutor, Lewis received a fellowship in English at Magdalen in 1925, where he began his long Oxford tenure. This same period of time also marked his slow conversion to Christianity, superbly chronicled in *Surprised by Joy*, and well supplemented in *C.S. Lewis: A Biography*.

This supplementation is, in fact, one of the strengths of Green's and Hooper's book. In *Surprised by Joy*, Lewis winnowed the events of his life to leave only those which he thought obviously connected to his abandonment of Absolute Idealism, his embrace of Theism, and finally his conversion to Christianity. But other events are equally telling about the course of Lewis' life during those years. Green and Hooper introduce, for example, the fact that the summer of 1930 found Lewis lolling frequently upon the banks of the muddy Thames River. Here, Lewis wrote to a friend, he was learning to dive, "which is a great change in my life and has important (religious) connections." Green and Hooper have found another comment on diving made years later by Lewis in one of his notebooks: "Nothing is simpler than this art. You do not need to do anything, you need only to stop doing something—to abstain from all attempt at self-preservation—to obey the command which Saint Augustine heard in a different context, *Securus te projice*."

This previously unknown quotation strikes me as one which, if I were forced to choose among all others, is most revealing about Lewis. However reckless the idea of abandoning self may seem to others, this idea was to Lewis a first principle of living. And for good reason. "Abstaining from all attempt at self-preservation" invited no existentialist leap into the void, but called for a posture of stillness, upon which the natural or spiritual order waited with salvation. In the case of the natural event, diving, the force of gravity pulled the body into the river, which in turn received it. Similarly, in the case of the spiritual event, believing in God, the end of a hanging onto self found the grace of God pulling the self into redemption. That Lewis saw spiritual analogues in his natural experiences was typical of his life and his writings, and the incredible fact, the fact which set Lewis apart from many other Christian writers of his era, was that these connections were fully organic, never awkward, never forced.

"Organic," moreover, may be the best characterization of the way Lewis' life grew from his adolescent romanticism and his classical education. In his youth Lewis strove for what he termed "Joy"—the pang of sweet desire for the Unknown—which had been occasioned by reading Nordic literature and listening to Wagner. Until he began the road to Christian conversion, Lewis thought that Joy was in principle attainable; hence, he read and read, and just plain could not satisfy his appetite for those romantic books which indicated something further. But during

the days of his Kirkpatrick tutorship the classical readings began to seep slowly into Lewis' sensibility; he started to become a philosopher. At Oxford, Lewis inevitably read the hefty tomes of Samuel Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity* and became convinced of the distinction between "enjoyment" and "contemplation."

Lewis explained the distinction: "The enjoyment and the contemplation of our inner activities are incompatible. You cannot hope and also think about hoping at the same moment." Lewis applied the distinction immediately to his own personal search for Joy. "I saw that all my waitings and watchings for Joy... had been a futile attempt to contemplate the enjoyed. All that such watching and waiting ever could find would be either an image... or a quiver in the diaphragm." Lewis learned that his particular experiences pointed beyond themselves to something transcendent, which he could not, by definition, force into his own net. All this, so far, can be had easily from Lewis' *Surprised by Joy*; but it is the strength of *C.S. Lewis* to show the growth, beyond the early adult years, of Lewis' romantic vision and his classical mind. His desire in childhood to be a poet had now at Oxford been transmuted into a desire to be an allegorist. No surprise, then, that Lewis' first full-length prose work was the *Pilgrim's Regress*, an allegory inspired by Bunyan's work. No surprise, either, that Lewis, no Bunyan as far as formal education was concerned, showered the book with Greek and Latin quotations. One of Lewis' friends objected to this inundation but Lewis replied characteristically: "One of the contentions of the book is that the decay of our old classical learning is a contributory cause of atheism." The quotations stayed.

Lewis went on to write better and more readable books than *Regress*, but the wellsprings of his work, no matter the genre, were always romanticism and classicism. Much of *C.S. Lewis* details the labors and discussions with others which went into the writing of many of Lewis' books. Along the way one learns, among other things, about the Inklings, a literary society which included J.R.R. Tolkien; the Socratic Club, a debating organization which pitted atheists or agnostics against Christians; the talks Lewis delivered on the BBC; Lewis' lifelong care for a widow, Mrs. Moore; and Lewis' meeting with and subsequent marriage to the American poet Joy Davidman.

Undoubtedly, Green and Hooper were forced because of space to pick and choose what to highlight; but I would have thought it necessary to include more about Lewis as a philosopher. After all, he intended to become a philosopher as an undergraduate, and his conversion to Christianity necessitated the traversing of heady philosophical terrain. Furthermore, he never did cease thinking in philosophical terms or joining in philosophical debate, and the Socratic Club did have these philosophers in regular attendance: Elizabeth Anscombe, the pupil of Wittgenstein at Cambridge; I.M. Crombie; Basil Mitchell, now the Professor of Philosophy of the Christian Religion at Oxford; and H.H. Price, the logician. Especially interesting would have been the reaction of Lewis, a dinosaur in matters of philosophy as well as most other things, to the trends in English philosophy after the idealism of Bradley and Green had faded. But Bertrand Russell is only obliquely mentioned, and G.E. Moore, J.L. Austin, and Wittgenstein are shut out completely.

In profiling Lewis during his Oxford and Cambridge days, Green and Hooper cast off dozens of choice items which, although of little consequence in themselves, will enter what has now come to be called "Lewisiana." As one might guess, this neologism is the product of Americans who, as Lewis himself noticed, have a tendency to lionize. Probably Americans will be the first to enjoy the comment of Dr. Bob Jones, Jr., the one from the college by the same name in South Carolina. Having met Lewis years ago, Jones later told Hooper: "That man smokes a pipe, and that man drinks liquor—but I *do* believe he is a Christian." Other similar tidbits abound: The queer eating habits of Lewis' dog, an abortive effort to launch a magazine called *Portico*; Lewis' nightmares; his habit of calling Clare Boothe Luce "Clara Bootlace"; his swims in the nude at Parson's Pleasure; his first meeting with T.S. Eliot; his avoidance of certain foods because of their alleged aphrodisiacal qualities; and his 1960 trip to Greece with his wife Joy Davidman.

These are all nice, chatty items and they will enlarge the perspective held by many Lewis readers. Those who have attended to the minutest detail of Lewis' works over the years, however, will want to know how Green and Hooper treat two difficult and very private areas of Lewis' life. One concerns a lacuna evinced by Lewis in *Surprised by Joy*; the other concerns the circumstances of his marriage to Joy Davidman.

About the first, Lewis bequeathed to his readership a large puzzle when, concerning the period from May 25, 1918 to January 1919, during which he was convalescing from a wound suffered in the First World War, he wrote: "I must warn the reader that one huge and complex episode will be omitted. I have no choice about this reticence. All I can or need say is that my earlier hostility to the emotions was very or variously avenged." Green and Hooper admit: "It is at this point in C.S. Lewis' life that his biographers find themselves in difficulties." They "follow up the evidence as far as it will take us," but they find "it does not, in fact, take us very far." Thus, the curious gap in Lewis' life remains pretty much the same.

Apart from satisfying our simple curiosity, it is hard to see why the obscure seven months in 1918-1919 mean much for an appreciation of Lewis' life. Green and Hooper would rather not pry anyway: "In a more civilized age Lewis' silence would be accepted as an absolute embargo on prying further into private affairs." But if "fully or variously avenging the emotions" involved a saturnalian good time, a possibility even suggested by Green and Hooper, well, so what? No similar period occurred again in Lewis' life, and anyone interested in what Lewis soberly thought about sex can read his views in *The Four Loves* or *Mere Christianity*.

But the circumstances of Lewis' marriage have more significance than that aroused by curiosity. After his wife died in 1960, Lewis wrote a splendid devotional book, *A Grief Observed*, which shone forth with great love and devotion for his departed spouse. Hence experienced readers will wonder why a self-confessed bachelor, even a self-confessed misogynist, should ever consent to the vows of marriage, especially in the twilight of his career. So Green and Hooper tell the story: Joy Davidman, freshly divorced and arrived with two small sons in England in 1954, became interested in Lewis, but he seemed impervious to her charms. Facing eviction as an alien from England, Davidman was given citizenship when Lewis magnanimously consented to a civil wedding at the Oxford registry. His reason: "pure friendship and expediency." Shortly thereafter, Davidman was struck with cancer, and close to death in a hospital. There she did not wish to die, and Lewis was in principle against having her in his house unless they were "married in the eyes of God as well as in the sight of man." So on March 21, 1957, the two were married in the hospital by an Anglican priest. Everyone expected Davidman to die soon, but then she suddenly and miraculously recovered, and Lewis found himself for the next three years in marital bliss, in which "no cranny of heart or body remained unsatisfied."

To hear Green's and Hooper's account, Lewis received "what he missed in his twenties" by a brilliant stroke of serendipity: he entered into both civil and religious marriage ceremonies for simply pragmatic and charitable reasons, but upon Davidman's recovery he found himself in a rich and fully consummated marriage. Maybe this is how it all happened; but one wonders if Lewis didn't have more of a desire for Joy Davidman as his *wife*, and one suspects so when the authors remark: "The progress of the relationship between Lewis and Joy was and remains, as it should be, their own secret." Perhaps Lewis' and Davidman's secret differs from Green's and Hooper's account.

Those bothered by this account can hope that one of thirty-odd Lewis researchers who now labor in the Bodleian Library at Oxford will turn new sod in the production of a better biography. However, I do not wish to see this field glutted, and I believe this estimation will be shared by many Lewis readers. No biography could bring as much pleasure as any one of Lewis' prose works. □

Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.

Liberal Democracy as a Mixed Regime

In the election of 1972 the coalition of which the Democratic Party is composed came unstuck as its voters divided into enthusiasts for McGovern or against Nixon and supporters of Wallace and Nixon. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the coalition dissolved further or that it parted temporarily, but my interest is not so much in the history of parties as in what this event reveals about the character of liberal democracy as a regime. It reveals that this regime is a mixture, usually made in a party coalition, of liberals and democrats.

The "liberals" are, of course, the McGovern enthusiasts in our example, but not only they, as we shall see. Such liberals might be called "opinion leaders" or identified by class or group, but I will define them as men of ambition who have enough demonstrable talent to think themselves capable of being outstanding in some way. Their ambition is usually moderate and varied, but it is real; and it is very important to them not to do merely what others do, to think what others think, or to be what others are. The "democrats," the ordinary voters (including most McGovern voters), are otherwise. They want what passes for a competence, no less than what most people have but no more; and they want this with security, more for the sake of their dignity (their "standard" of living) than for any level of comfort, and more against injustice than against loss. They prefer a quiet, private life, and are satisfied with the praise and esteem of their friends. Last but not least, the democrats are many and the liberals are relatively few.

Now since our regime is often called a liberal democracy, and liberal democracy is a regime that takes pride in diversity, why should it be necessary to discover that liberal democracy is a mixture of liberals and democrats? The answer is that the liberals resist being defined as I have defined them. They want to think of themselves as democrats, as I have defined *them*. This resistance, I will try to show, lies at the root of the troubles of liberal democracy today, including those of liberal democrats in the 1972 election, because liberal democracy is so mixed as to conceal intentionally the ambitions of liberals. To see why and how this was done, we must consider the classical source of the mixed regime in Aristotle's political science, out of which, and against which, liberal democracy was conceived.

According to Aristotle, almost all modern, civilized regimes are democracies or oligarchies. They may be defined as the rule of the many and of the few in fact, since it happens that the poor are many and the rich few (questionable in contemporary America), they are the rule of the poor and of the rich. The difference between the poor and the rich is highly visible to all, including the poor and the rich, and it is perhaps most impressive to ordinary men or "democrats" who judge life by the level of security and comfort. This difference is perhaps also the first observation of a traveller in a foreign land: "how do people live here?" means "how well do they live?," which means "how well-off are they?"

To Have and Have Not

Yet Aristotle's classification of these regimes by the number who rule is significant of their similarity: both the poor and the rich (as such), and hence their regimes, are concerned above all with wealth; and a regime of the "have-nots" does not differ in *quality* from a regime of the "haves." We know that any share of wealth can be expressed as a quantity of money to make it comparable with other wealth; so when wealth is the end of politics, citizens are comparable and countable as quantity. Democracies constituted as rule of the poor—that is, most democracies of which we have experience—are in a sense indistinguishable from oligarchies. As the poor seek to become rich, they behave as the rich do: they expropriate the expropriators, and fall into faction and conflict. For wealth considered as pure quantity—as an end in itself rather than as a means to a certain quality of life—is an unstable principle. One never knows how much is enough either for comfort and security or for dignity of life. The security (not to mention comfort) of a mortal body seems to be an ideal (if we may call it that) impossible of realization, and quantified dignity measured in money is perfectly relative to the indignity of other men and therefore intensely competitive.

Indeed, what is the dignity of having more money as opposed to more of anything else? What can be the value of having more unless we know more *what*? This question applies to poor and rich alike, since we need to know what the rich do with their money and what the poor would do with theirs. It is not enough to answer for the poor that they would like to survive; their right to life implies a certain quality in human life. Mere quantity offers no basis for a human right to survive, for there are other species more numerous than ours with more mouths to feed and other species less numerous than ours which are more in danger of extinction. Both ants and eagles are more needy than the human poor. But even in our ecological concern, we are concerned for the survival of species, not for mere number but for the number of a certain species or kind or what. The certain quality of human life is not so easily defined as is that of other species. When we look at the human community we do not see the uniform qualities of ants and eagles; rather, we see first of all a difference between rich and poor which appears to lead nowhere—into a meaningless dispute over quantity, not toward a definition of quality. This indetermination of humanity—our inability to see easily what we are—obliges us to make claims as to what we are in some less visible respect to which all men do not obviously measure up. These are claims as to what we ought to be. Such claims are almost inevitably partisan because they begin from a quality each of us thinks he has and proceed to generalize or absolutize this quality as the human quality. Thus the establishment of human dignity involves us in the promotion of some humans over others, one individual over others, one party over others, one country over others. In our day atomic weapons have made human beings an endangered species, but in no way have they helped to define a human being. So the diverse claims by which men assert themselves to be human continue to cause political conflict in our day as in Aristotle's. It does not seem possible either to reduce political conflict without defining human dignity, or to define human dignity without risking political conflict. Contrary to B.F. Skinner, the problem of security and the problem of dignity arise together and cannot be solved separately.

Therefore, when Aristotle puts together a mixed regime of the rich and the poor, he seeks a standard by which to mix them, an understanding of the human good or virtue. The rich and the poor must be defined according to this standard in order that they be mixed, because as mere quantities of wealth or human bodies they can attempt to solve political disputes only by outcounting their opponents or preponderating over them. But since it is never clear what they are counting, the result of the count is always open to dispute and will be disputed. Because of their failure to appreciate quality, the rich and the poor cannot find out what they are in disputing each other, although it is true that when they face each other, certain qualities typical of the rich and poor are called forth. These qualities are tautness in the rich, as they find they are few and must defend themselves against the poor, and softness in the poor, as they seek to embrace everyone in order to deny privileges to the few. At this point one can speak of oligarchical and democratic qualities. More precisely, however, one must speak of the formal character of qualities, which are "oligarchic" insofar as they define themselves against others and "democratic" by the willingness of matter to receive them. We are reminded of the forms and

the potentiality of matter in Aristotle's less political treatises, but we are also reminded of the liberals and democrats in liberal democracy: liberals exhibit outstanding qualities and democrats receive them with enthusiasm, tolerance, or disgust. Evidently the quality of the mixed regime is not established until the oligarchical and the democratic contributions are brought together, and we still do not know what they contribute to. Someone is needed to help the partisans move toward the quality that is the standard of their mix, someone who has knowledge of human virtue. The dialectic of party conflict does not move toward resolution on its own. Without a helping hand, parties win and lose in defense or pursuit of wealth.

The difficulty is that the standard of human dignity and political sovereignty is not visible. Aristotle says that "it is not so easy to see beauty of soul as beauty of body" (*Politics* 1254b 39). We may take this for a considerable understatement, but we cannot overlook the fact that he says beauty of soul can be seen. This is Aristotle's task in constructing the mixed regime: to find a standard which makes invisible virtue visible so that men can see beauty of soul. Invisible virtue is the intellectual virtue that most men, including most rulers, cannot recognize or appreciate. Such virtue cannot be the basis of political agreement in the situation, which of course continues today because it is the unchangeable human condition, where the vast majority of mankind is quite satisfied with its share of wisdom, each with his own. Against this majority intellectual virtue cannot even defend itself, much less instruct others. Or perhaps it could defend itself by instructing others. To do so, the man of intellectual virtue or the man who seeks it, the philosopher, would have to become a political scientist for his own sake as well as for the benefit of the community. He would have to make his virtue political and to make politics receptive to his virtue. He would aid the democratic and oligarchical parties to define themselves in accordance with a standard that improves and mixes their qualities while elevating them above the concern for mere wealth. The political scientist aids the parties, and neither neglects them nor rules them. He must not neglect them because they cannot fashion their own mixed regime unaided, and he does not rule them because he cannot.

If the mixed regime is made to a standard of human virtue, then it cannot merely mix democracy and oligarchy as they are found. This would be a mixed regime in which both poor and rich rule, sharing the offices but not ceasing to be or to consider themselves poor and rich. Although together, poor and rich would remain intact in a sort of democracy. Not the many but all would rule, as accords with the claim of democracy to be the rule of all, that is, both few and many. But this regime would surely degenerate into an unmixed partisan regime at the first opportunity for poor or rich to impose itself on the other, and it would not have any basis but common concern for wealth. Another mixed regime would mix poor and rich by splitting the difference between them, as when a small quantity of wealth above the lowest poverty defines a citizen. As the first mixed regime is a sort of democracy this is a sort of oligarchy with a property qualification, but low enough to include many democrats. It is based not on what is common to both extremes but on what is between them; it presupposes or calls for the existence of a middle class between the poor and the rich. This mixed regime is then an improvement on the first because it begins to overcome the most visible difference in a society: the middle class is visibly neither poor nor rich. Yet the middle class as such is not essentially superior to the poor and the rich; it would be like the poor if necessary and like the rich if possible. Lacking a quality of its own, it has difficulty in defending itself from the claims of the extremes, and when one extreme asserts itself the middle class regime, too, easily degenerates into a partisan regime.

The establishment of human dignity involves us in the promotion of some humans over others, one individual over others, one party over others, one country over others.

A third mixed regime to transcend the poor and the rich is needed. To construct such a regime the political scientist must satisfy two contrary requirements in what will maintain the regime. For attracting the partisans to the regime, it is necessary that both democracy and oligarchy be visible to them so that they can find something to like; but for maintaining the regime, no part of it should desire any other regime. The problem is that attracting the partisans does not diminish but rather increases their desire for democracy or oligarchy unmixed. How can they be weaned away from the very taste by which they are attracted?

Aristotle's solution is in the ordering of the regime. The political scientist takes the democratic mode of lot and the oligarchical or aristocratic mode of choice and combines them in the various offices to make an order. The democratic and oligarchic modes are there to appeal to the partisans, but they have been formalized in accordance with the qualities of democracy and oligarchy so that they contribute to a whole. The democratic quality of "open to all" and the oligarchical quality of "reserved for the few" are preserved and in view, but arranged in a visible order reflecting the intention of the legislator. The visible order implies the existence of an invisible order in the soul of the legislator, since bodies in an order may be taken to imply soul. The American government, for example, is not a mere haphazard combination of diverse parts but a certain order of institutions from which we could infer an intention of the Founders even if we did not have ample evidence that one (or more than one) exists. When Aristotle discusses the distribution of the three parts of regimes in Book IV of the *Politics,* he separates them as activities of the soul or of the rational soul: deliberating, judging, and the ruling that connects them. Each part of the regime is then shown to have many possible orderings with different degrees of democracy and oligarchy so that the whole regime in its intricacy can vary to show the legislator's intention visibly and with easy discrimination. Democracy and oligarchy are mixed and transcended by transforming them into qualities of the soul, while the soul of the legislator is made visible in the order of democratic and oligarchical institutions. The partisans would be led from their initial allegiance to the modes by which they were attracted to an appreciation of the ordering of the whole, and thus to participation in the legislator's bipartisan intention.

The partisans may well resist this invitation. It is no part of Aristotle's political science to underestimate the resistance men offer to proposals made for their own good. On the contrary, it could be said that he develops the standard for the mixed regime from this very resistance. Men resist having their own good imposed on them out of a sense that no other can have the concern for preserving one's body as will equal the interest of its resident. One's body even resents instructions from one's own soul, as we know. This spirited resistance of the body against the tyranny of the soul, even or especially against beneficial tyranny, is itself an activity or part of the soul. It serves to defend the body but it also transcends mere preservation of the body when, for example, a man dies in his own self-defense. In politics, such spirit can be understood as the basis for the democratic claim of freedom. The many democrats are poor, but since poverty is a mere lack, they cannot advance a claim to rule because they are poor. Poverty is nothing to be proud of. The democrats claim rule because they represent the claim of the body against the soul yet made within the soul.

When the democrats advance the claim of freedom, they assert that all free bodies are equal and transform individual selfishness into good-natured democratic openness. But when freedom is exercised in choice, oligarchical exclusion comes into use; for after the choice what is

chosen must be defended against what is rejected and indiscrimate democratic openness cannot be sustained. At the same time oligarchical choice can be directed to the legislation of better qualities than the defense of wealth (for wealth when defended can be considered a quality). The freedom of man is specified in qualities visible in the habits of a people living under a legislated regime, and just as the order of a regime implies the intention of a legislator, the visible habits of a people imply the existence of a certain moral virtue in their souls. Moral virtue can be inferred, and also produced, from the very resistance men offer to their own good, because that resistance presupposes a special dignity in the matter or quantity of human beings. Moral virtue is not exactly a virtue of the soul; it is the habit of using the body as if the body had a soul. Therefore, it is most easily inferred, and beauty of the soul is most visible, in the noblest deeds. For making virtue visible, Aristotle relies on the splendor of moral virtue. Political peace and stability in the mixed regime are built on what can be seen in or inferred from the deeds of the noblest political men. They must be trained to appreciate the worth of politics, and the city has to be persuaded to accept them and to be inspired by them as was Amphipolis by its sacrifices for (or to) the Spartan Brasidas (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1134b 24). This mixed regime when fully developed is nothing less than aristocracy, and rare if not impossible. Every lesser mixed regime depends on its possibility and reflects some of its shine. Yet beyond the visible mixed regime is the invisible mixed regime. Democracy and oligarchy can be mixed only in the soul of the best man which is out of public view but concerned for the public good; compared to this soul, all visible arrangements are more or less mediocre and merely attempt where he succeeds. Invisible virtue is made visible in Aristotle's mixed regime, but the standard of the mix remains the best soul.

Freedom for the Ambitious

The modern mixed regime of liberal democracy is very different from this one, indeed conceived against this one. Its basis is democracy, not aristocracy, yet strangely it begins from democracy and proceeds to aristocracy, like Aristotle. The modern mix is based on the equality of man, for all are said to be equal in an original state of nature. No man is naturally the ruler of any other; and in society all live as they please with rights that secure their liberty. Having followed Aristotle's reasoning, we might wonder how it is possible to maintain the dignity of the human over the non-human if some men are not considered natural rulers over others. But this was precisely the intention of the founders or proto-founders of liberal democracy, John Locke and his friends. They desired passionately to defend the dignity of man which they saw endangered by the enslavement of men to

The consequence of liberty for all is unequal honors and wealth for the few who are able to take better advantage of equal liberty.

priests and priestly education. To counter this menace, their defense of human dignity took the form of a denial of the superiority of soul, because it was soul and its invisible virtue which gave the priests their handle with which to manipulate men. They accepted the equality of man because it was a necessary consequence of the primacy of body, and they left human dignity at human liberty out of the same necessity.

Another consequence is that the democratic and oligarchical parties are transformed into democrats and liberals as described above. Since man's freedom must be kept from implying the superiority of soul, the democrats who were asserters of freedom according to Aristotle must be restrained from making the characteristic claim by which they transcend mere quantity. Their resistance is now understood as malleable matter, and the democrats become the unassertive, "apathetic" many. They are now the beneficiaries rather than the asserters of freedom; in exchange for their standard of dignity they are promised and given a rise in their standard of living. Democracy, now known as "pure democracy," yields to liberal democracy in which the party conflict is no longer between democrats and oligarchs but within the oligarchs or liberals. For the liberals, the ambitious men, are now the sole asserters of freedom. Freedom for them means just what it means to the people, which is living as you please; but since it pleases them to excel in some way, the consequence of liberty for all is unequal honors and wealth for the few. The principle of equality results in equal liberty, justifying inequality for the few who are able to take better advantage of equal liberty. Yet although these profiteers of equal opportunity have a good thing for themselves, their self-assertion is for the benefit of the democrats rather than against them. They use soul or reason in defense of body, not to flaunt their superior qualities; so in effect they assert not only their own dignity but human dignity in general. And because they are allowed to use soul in defense of body, they are not expected to use body as if it were soul, in the way of moral virtue. Their qualities are impressed on the inert class, the "opinion followers," in some degree, but the difference in ambition remains. The democrats approve or tolerate ambition; the liberals have it. This difference is not overcome in the mix of honors and benefits characteristic of liberal democracy.

There are two principal rights in a liberal democracy and two kinds of liberals to exploit them. The first is the right of acquiring private property. It is justified for the common good, but—or and—the few best acquisitors profit most. The opportunities of free enterprise awaken the desires of talented men, but also engage their competitiveness. Their ambition for political honors is turned at least partly to what is called "success" in economic matters. To be "successful" is to compete not only to make money, but for the sake of competing—to win, to overcome "a challenge." Those in our day who drop out of competitive acquisition do not call it a hog trough but call it a "rat race," and this despite the fact according to them that the Establishment is run by pigs. In Locke's more stately language, the "quarrelsome and contentious" are diverted from politics to the making of money, where yet much of their political ambition can be satisfied. This is good for them and others; for the result as we have seen is to "increase the common stock of mankind."

Liberalism recognizes the need of some men to aspire to more than they need, and channels this need for excess into the common benefit. Let the contentious engage in the bloodless killing of commerce. Their success may at worst bankrupt their rivals, and it helps the people, the democrats. The rich are allowed to remain rich, rather encouraged to become ever richer, if they turn to a private life in a privatized society. Their ostentation is more or less confined to certain "exclusive" neighborhoods and country clubs; it is not directly political and not obvious in the halls of power. The rich do not rule as rich, although they surely exert influence. The poor in the meantime live a more comfortable life, and do not have to feel envious of a class that visibly rules because it is rich.

The other right is the right of free speech, which we also find in Locke's political philosophy. This right is justified as for the common good in the doctrine that the government has no business caring for souls. We are thus informed that the common good is to be found in caring for the body, but it is also implied that the common good so defined needs to be continually defended against attempts to define it as something more. Such attempts, as we have seen in Aristotle's political science, arise naturally from the partisan assertions and counter-assertions of the democrats and oligarchs to be found in every regime. Accordingly, the right of free speech at the beginning was asserted from a polemical stance against religion and soul-caring. Although it took the form of a universal openness to speech

whatever its content or source, free speech was brought forth with intent to oppose and exclude the speech characteristic of priests and their scholarly clerks. In both respects, the right of free speech was a typical partisan assertion. Its early asserters in the seventeenth century opposed, but could not drive out offensive soul-speech because of the endemic human susceptibility to it, and so even today, when fire-breathing votaries of religion are sometimes indistinguishable from flaming liberals, there is need of a group that will defend the doctrine supporting free speech.

Businessmen vs. Intellectuals

It is evident that the doctrine that the government has no business caring for souls protects both the democratic principle of living as you please and the liberal-democratic right of acquiring private property. Living as you please is surer with the body that is surely yours, even if temporarily (and as to mortality, perhaps science will find a cure for it), than with a soul that may be someone else's or no one's or yours on condition of good behavior. And the right of acquiring private property must be protected against limitations whose source is concern for the soul of a greedy man, though not against limitations whose purpose and effect are to "increase the common stock of mankind" and to ensure that the bodies of the poor are fed, preserved, and made fit and comfortable. Liberalism is necessarily laissez faire with regard to the soul but not with regard to the body, and old-fashioned laissez faire liberals opposed the "social legislation" of interventionist liberals on behalf of the bodies of the poor mainly because it feared the effect on their souls: with coddled bodies the poor would forget to live as they please and begin asking the government to care for their souls. This fear has been countered with the thought that unless their bodies are made comfortable, the poor will ask the government to care for their souls.

Yet when all this has been said to prove that the right of free speech is for the common good, one must still ask the question we are accustomed to ask about the right of free enterprise: who profits most? The answer, obviously, is those who speak the best. Just as under free enterprise the best money-makers profit the most, so under free speech the best speakers earn the highest reputation if not the most money—though frequently they get both. These speakers run the gamut from poets, philosophers, and scientists to the big thinkers and polished *artistes* at the bottom of the media; in sum, we know them as intellectuals. Intellectuals have much more freedom in liberal democracy than in the ancient democracies, and as is the case with the businessmen, we may suppose that this is allowed with respect for the ambition and pugnacity which they might otherwise waste in hostility for the vulgar and anti-democratic scheming. There is something of honorable ambition in the name "intellectual" as compared to "philosopher"—lover of wisdom—which is not altogether effaced in the Marxian formula "worker of the brain." Patrick Henry's ringing cry "Give me liberty or give me death!" has been restated with routine bravado in the slogan "publish or perish" but without softening the firm impression that the intellectual of our day is still full of fight and eager for the highest prizes of scholarly controversy.

This, then, is another group with a stake in the privatized life of liberal society whose privileges are justified as for the common benefit, or at least as having "redeeming social value." Again, although this group exerts influence, its ostentation is not directly political. In America today it thrives in the universities and in the media, two institutions which may be said to converge in the domain of public television. It is not oppressive mastery to be confronted with the opportunity of watching public television.

These two groups, businessmen and intellectuals, are the "liberals" of liberal democracy. They make use of another group of liberals, the politicians. For liberal democracy does not mix without the work of skilled politicians who must build alliances and persuade both other liberals and democrats to see and to act in accordance with their interests. The unpolitical or less political liberals make use of politicians to ally with the people, that is, with the democrats or with different groups of democrats. At present businessmen are concentrated in the Republican Party, while intellectuals flock to the Democratic Party. In obedience to the fundamental democracy of the modern mixed regime, and some of them are socialists; but they propose to nationalize only the means of producing economic articles, never the means of artistic or intellectual expression, and they have an ultimate, existential concern for the well-being of the copyright law. Thus, both kinds of liberals are induced by their political alliances, which are determined by the fundamental mixing principle of liberal democracy, to deny that they are in any way remarkable. To show or perhaps to feel their loyalty in the alliance, they blame others for elitism but do not admit it of themselves.

No *Noblesse*, No *Oblige*

Early liberal philosophers and statesmen such as Locke and the authors of *The Federalist* carefully worked out the new mixed regime. They specified the rights and duties of liberals in regard to democrats while making it clear that the unequal qualities of men are in the service of the more fundamental equality of man. They have made the benefits of this regime visible to the democrats, who remain generally loyal to it; but it may be doubted whether they succeeded in making the benefits visible to the liberals. Now we have theories of pluralist liberalism which almost suppose that liberal society is an automatic system of interest groups that nearly does away with the political problem of mixing liberals and democrats. In these theories it is as if the liberals were just collectivities of democrats having therefore no duties to the democrats. Liberals do not govern society because society does not need to be governed: there is no *noblesse*, so no requirement that *noblesse oblige*.

The liberals...do not see that they as liberals must contribute to the whole, but instead they use their unequal status to destroy tolerance for unequal status.

these two groups of unequals seek to advance their claims under the banner of equality. Each of them is very complacent about its own inequality, but constantly accusing the other of being anti-democratic.

Businessmen live with easy conscience in fine houses, drive expensive cars, and hold important offices of management while complaining of high-sounding ignorance from pretending upstarts ("effete intellectual snobs") who have never met a payroll and/or do not know what it is to work. Intellectuals, for their part, take for granted their ability to publish their undying thoughts in indelible ink, to be quoted in the media, and to receive the adulation of the young; but they despise know-nothing businessmen who have never taught a class and/or do not know what it is to study. They say that America suffers terribly from *economic* inequality

Such theories have been criticized in recent years by the radicals. The radicals ask why it is that in liberal democracy, liberals happen to come out on top? It must be that they govern from behind the scenes in an Establishment, a network of indirect and informal government which cleverly ensures their dominance. The Establishment must be exposed and "all power to the people." But the "people" in the radicals' slogan contains their own ambitious selves eager for honor and power. The radicals are "liberals" too, and they fall to their own critique of liberalism. If they are now in eclipse, it is partly because no Establishment in liberal society has appeared with such boring frequency as that of the radical movement.

The problem in liberal democracy is in the liberals, not the democrats. The liberals have forgotten they are liberals, and

now believe they are democrats. It is not that they are virtuous men wishing to maintain a prudent obscurity before the unremarkable many; the liberals have been more democratic in their demands than the democrats, and thus have become invisible to themselves. Out of embarrassment the younger and even some of the older liberals dress and behave in such a way that no one could accuse them, on superficial acquaintance, of being gentlemen. They do not see how they profit more from equal rights, and so they take their own inequality for granted. They do not see that they as liberals must contribute to the whole, but instead they use their unequal status to destroy tolerance for unequal status. They speak as if the whole were not a mix but merely democratic, and as if it could be created by the verbal exertions of partisan extremism. Tocqueville expressed his fear that American democracy would suffer from "individualism," by which he meant the danger that former aristocrats in a democracy would sulk and live privately in apathy. Today the two wings of our liberal aristocrats reveal an active hostility to see each other and at the least an inadequate comprehension of liberal democracy as a mixed regime. It may be that they lost sight of themselves at the time when the intellectuals came under the influence of romanticism and Marxism and, to put it mildly, lost their sense of community with businessmen, then dubbed the bourgeoisie. Whatever the cause, the groups that Locke joined were put asunder. Now they have taken refuge with the many, and have justified their own privileges by attacking others'.

In liberal democracy, the mixing principle does not make virtue visible. Liberal democracy therefore has a dual advantage over the ancient mixed regime of a more democratic appearance and a more oligarchical reality. The result should please both parties, but the trouble is that liberal oligarchs have been taken in by the appearance more than the democrats. They are allowing or urging liberal democracy to be transformed into an extreme democracy to which men who wish to excel cannot contribute and in which they cannot live without increasing frustration, self-delusion, and hypocrisy I do not propose a return to Aristotle's moral splendor, or to the exemplary arrogance of the British aristocracy, but to the wisdom of that liberal democrat Thomas Jefferson, who frankly spoke of democracy's need for natural aristocrats—though to be sure in a private letter. The success of the mixed regime of liberal democracy depends on a recognition that it *is* a mixed regime, and that although liberals can *contribute* to democracy, they cannot *become* democrats and should not try. □

Morton Gaither

Washington Report

(WASHINGTON, December, 1975)—Following the Soviet surprise missile attack on December 7, which virtually annihilated the entire U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the declaration by OPEC nations of a total and permanent oil embargo against this country, comments and reactions from all quarters have swamped the Washington press corps. However, this reporter has attempted to distill enough of these to give the reader the flavor of what the important people are saying and doing in this latest crisis.

As news reports continue to arrive here, it has become clear that the Soviets are in complete control of the Mediterranean and that our oil supplies will be exhausted before spring. Against this background Secretary of State Kissinger called a special press conference to announce that in the name of the National Security Council he had recommended to President Ford that an alert at the level of Defcon 3 be ordered. "I wish to make clear," he stated in measured tones, "that the policy of detente is still in effect. The recent actions by certain nations with whom we have been attempting to improve our relations have been unhelpful, and the government of the United States is disappointed and discouraged by this behavior; but we hope that by our firm yet unthreatening response we can show the powers in question that it is to their interests as well as our own that the progress and extension of detente continue smoothly and without disturbing incident."

Asked whether the crisis would cause the U.S. government to cancel the sale of one million tons of soybean meal to Russia or the negotiations for the sale of 100 Phantom F-4s to Saudi Arabia, the Secretary stated that since the soybean meal is not war materiel and since Saudi Arabia had not directly participated in the overt military action, he saw no reason why the recent unpleasantness should be considered in relation to normal commercial intercourse between friendly nations. However, he added the United States government was prepared to take appropriate action in the event that these nations continued to be uncooperative.

Eric Sevareid, in an unaccustomedly somber mood, stated that after thirty years of cold war with the Communist powers, we were obviously still no nearer to peace, and that if this nation really wanted peace, it would have to make some hard choices.

President Ford asked the Security Council to hold an emergency meeting at his ski lodge in Vail, where he is vacationing. According to Mr. Ron Nessen, when the President has studied carefully all of the options, he will make a full report to the nation, and will meet with congressional leaders to work out a comprehensive program of action.

The Democratic caucus of the House of Representatives quickly passed a resolution affirming its intention not to permit flag-waving by the Ford Administration to distract the caucus from vigorous promotion of national health insurance, increased social security, and a higher minimum wage. Several members declared their view that the current "crisis" had been "manufactured" by the Administration to divert public attention from its domestic failures.

Senator McGovern stated on "Face the Nation" that the reductions in the size of the Navy had been inadequate, since only the Sixth Fleet was involved, and that further cuts would have to be forthcoming, as recommended in the latest policy statement of the Democratic Party He pointed out that the Defcon 3 alert was costing the government about thirty million dollars per day, most of which would benefit only the oil companies and the aerospace giants.

The joint Administration-congressional committee appointed last March by President Ford stated that in view of the crisis it would make every effort to complete its report on energy policy as soon as possible. However, observers say that the committee is at loggerheads on the question of rationing and that no consensus can be expected at an early date

A spokesman for the Department of the Navy complained at a press conference that his service was continually called upon to bear the brunt of surprise attacks. "Why should it always be the Navy which suffers losses on December 7," he asked, "when this is never taken into consideration at the time of appropriations?"

The recently-formed Armed Services Union, the organization of volunteer enlisted men and women, reported a surge in new membership following the announcement that a strike vote was being prepared in the event that the President

announced any intention of military hostilities. "We did not volunteer to enter into armed combat at the whim of the President," the statement read. "So far we have not been consulted in this matter, nor given an opportunity to express our many reservations with regard to any attempt to seek a military solution." It is expected that strong support from federal, state, and local civil service employee organizations will be forthcoming. The American Civil Liberties Union has offered its services in all legal actions arising out of refusals to obey military orders.

In the *New York Times,* an unusual joint column by Anthony Lewis and Tom Wicker emphasized that the essential issue in the crisis was the moral one. "If the United States, despite its record in Korea and in Vietnam, despite its indifference to poverty and hunger in the world, and its refusal to admit the existence of these conditions at home—if the United States still feels that it has a moral case to present, it should press this case before the only appropriate body—the United Nations, where the one-nation, one-vote principle would permit the developing nations to participate in the collective judgment."

The United Nations in New York was, in fact, a beehive of activity. Ambassador Scali convened an emergency session of the Security Council in the early hours of December 8. The Council entertained a resolution of the United States in condemnation of "unwarranted and irresponsible violations of the Charter." The ensuing spirited debate was seen by millions on television. The Soviet Union introduced a counter-resolution charging the United States with extreme provocative action against the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, citing the destruction of three missile boats and a destroyer. "The Soviet forces naturally took defensive action in accordance with international law."

The People's Republic of China stated that the poor farmers and working peoples of the world would not be deceived by the collusive maneuvering of the two imperialist co-conspirators, but would continue to work toward socialist liberation.

The ambassadors of France and the United Kingdom made almost identical speeches in which they cautioned against haste and urged that no action be taken pending a thorough investigation of the very grave charges and countercharges by members of the Council against each other.

Public interest in the Security Council debate almost obscured the important and humiliating defeat of the United States in the General Assembly, which passed a sharply-worded condemnation of American imperialism, and a vote of thanks to the Soviet Union for forestalling an attempt by the United States to reestablish a colonial empire in the Mediterranean. Both resolutions were introduced by Syria and seconded by Sweden. The United States was supported only by South Africa, Israel, Bolivia, and Liberia. The Secretary of State in Washington was said to have privately expressed particular annoyance at the abstentions of Britain and France.

The Reuters correspondent in Beirut reported that a spokesman for the Palestine Liberation Organization claimed credit for the sinking of one U.S. aircraft carrier in the eastern Mediterranean, charging that the vessel was engaged in carrying planes, pilots, and bacteriological weapons to Israel. The Department of State in Washington said that this allegation was without foundation. The Department of the Navy had no comment. □

James Q. Wilson

Checking Our Premises on Crime

(This article has been adapted from Mr. Wilson's latest book, Thinking about Crime, *published in June by Basic Books, New York, New York 10022.)*

The proper design of public policies requires a clear and sober understanding of the nature of man, and above all of the extent to which that nature can be changed. Crime is not the only issue that evokes this theme, but it is one that does so dramatically and it happens to be one that I have, quite without intending it, found myself studying on and off for the last ten or twelve years.

As I have studied, first the police and then crime itself, I have been struck by how remote from the reality I have observed is the rhetoric I have heard. Demands that the police "get tough" and "crack down" on crime seem incongruous given what I have learned, from hundreds of hours spent in patrol cars, about what the police actually spend their time doing. Public entertainments in which the climax of the mystery story is the arrest of the guilty party bewilder me because, in the real world, an arrest rarely ends anything. The arrested person is usually released within a few hours, will probably not come to trial for months, and, even if his guilt is determined, has an excellent chance of being returned to society promptly without any penalty at all. Most of those charged with offenses can be divided into two groups: those for whom arrest is an embarrassment and those for whom it is a mere inconvenience.

The intense debate over the evidentiary rules governing search and seizure, police interrogations, and the taking of confessions, while it illuminates some interesting legal and philosophic issues, has a hollow ring when recalled in the context of what actually happens in a police station house. Most persons arrested for the more common serious crimes, such as burglary and robbery, have been arrested under circumstances such that no confession is required, no searches need be conducted, and scarcely any police interrogation occurs. Often they are caught right in the act of robbing or burgling. Frequently there are witnesses to testify or stolen property that can be identified. Many—I should say most—of those arrested, far from wishing to remain silent behind their constitutionally protected rights, are eager to talk in order to see whether, by confessing to other crimes or implicating other persons, they can lighten the charges against them.

The claim that slum residents despise the police and refuse their aid, often made by nonslum residents who wish, for various reasons, to see the police in poor neighborhoods incapacitated or removed, is a strange claim if one has spent the night in a station house or patrol car. One observes the constant stream of humanity, much of its poor and black, seeking police assistance for every imaginable problem, from crime to marital disputes, broken windows to electric failures, drunkenness to terminal illness.

The passionate debate over the death penalty as a deterrent to murder is difficult to interpret when one remembers the murders one has actually seen. There is a night of drinking. The conversation turns to money or women. Rights are asserted and disputed, greed claimed and denied, sexual prerogatives demanded and rejected. A fight begins. Someone picks up a knife or a gun. A body falls, a neighbor screams, the police arrive, the culprit is encountered, still standing with the weapon in his hand, gazing in drunken bewilderment at his victim.

The theory that crime is an expression of the political rage of the dispossessed, rebelling under the iron heel of capitalist tyranny, leaves one wondering why virtually every nation in the world, capitalist, socialist, and communist, has experienced in recent years rapidly increasing crime rates. Such a theory also leaves one dissatisfied with the explanation it pur-

ports to offer for why fifteen-year-old boys tear a purse from the hands of a poor black woman on a subway train, why rioters loot each other's homes but not the bank on the corner, or why cars are stolen from parking lots and shipped, repainted, to big cities where they can be resold at bargain prices to affluent businessmen.

But above all, I have found inexplicable the theories of human nature that seem to be implicit in much of the public rhetoric about crime: "Men steal because they are poor and deprived." There is more crime in most poor neighborhoods than in most well-off ones, but even in poor communities most people do not steal. Furthermore, crime rose the fastest in this country at a time when the number of persons living in poverty or squalor was declining. No doubt many persons believe that crime produces higher incomes with less effort than available legitimate jobs. But those who are prepared to consider seriously the objective benefits of crime will surely give some, perhaps equal, attention to the objective costs of crime. Therefore, it cannot be simply the case that "men steal because they are poor." If objective conditions are used to explain crime, then the full statement must be: "Men steal because the benefits of stealing exceed the costs of stealing by a wider margin than the benefits of working exceed the costs of working." In short, spokesmen who use poverty as an explanation of crime should, by the force of their own logic, be prepared to consider the capacity of society to deter crime by raising the risks of crime. But they rarely do. Indeed, those who use poverty as an explanation are largely among the ranks of those who vehemently deny that crime can be deterred.

Advocates of increasing the harshness of penalties commit the same error, but in the opposite direction. "Man will not steal if the penalty is sufficiently severe." No doubt, very severe penalties will deter many people from stealing, *if* those who consider stealing believe the penalty is likely to be exacted; *if* the penalty, discounted by the chances of avoiding it, is of greater value than the proceeds of the crime, discounted by the chances of not getting away with it; and *if* there is no other source of income (such as a job) that would produce greater net gains. The United States has, on the whole, the most severe set of criminal penalties in its lawbooks of any advanced Western nation; it also has the highest crime rate of most advanced Western nations. One reason may be that our penalties are so high that they are rarely imposed. Another may be that we have not only a high crime rate, but a high level of personal affluence and an abundant consumer economy. A person wishing to drive a fancy car may well conclude that the slight chance of having to pay a heavy penalty should he be caught stealing is more than outweighed by the immediate pleasure he will derive from having the car, a pleasure that he would have to defer for a long time, perhaps indefinitely, if he were content with the low-paying jobs available to him. Getting institutions to work as we want them to work (in this case, to impose *any* penalties, much less severe ones) and insuring that there exist attractive alternatives to the courses of action we do penalize are more important, and more difficult, tasks than changing a statute to read "twenty years in jail" instead of "ten years in jail."

"Crime and drug addiction can only be dealt with by attacking their root causes." I am sometimes inclined, when in a testy mood, to rejoin: "Stupidity can only be dealt with by attacking its root causes." I have yet to see a "root cause" or to encounter a government program that has successfully attacked it, at least with respect to those social problems that arise out of human volition rather than technological malfunction. But more importantly, the demand for causal solutions is, whether intended or not, a way of deferring any action and criticizing any policy. It is a cast of mind that inevitably detracts attention from those few things that governments can do reasonably well and draws attention toward those many things it cannot do at all.

Consider heroin addiction. For decades various public and private agencies tried to cure addicts, either by simply withdrawing them from heroin or, through the provision of various psychological and other services, by eliminating the "root causes" of their addiction. With few exceptions, these efforts failed. In the 1960s a massive law-enforcement effort was made to reduce the availability of heroin, and doctors began supplying addicts with methadone as an alternative. Methadone was not a "cure" for addiction, and of course neither was law enforcement. Indeed, methadone had some problems of its own. But methadone had one powerful advantage: As a relatively benign addictive drug that suppresses withdrawal pains, it is a powerful inducement for many addicts to enter and remain in treatment programs, and is a pharmacological tool for stabilizing the addict while in treatment and in the community. Whether the addict, thus stabilized, can improve himself and avoid relapsing into euphoria-seeking drug use depends on a number of things, not the least of which are his own motivation and the support given him by employers and family. Meanwhile, law enforcement has made heroin much harder to find and, when found, both much less potent (i.e., more heavily diluted) and much more expensive. The combined effect of these two strategies, coupled (as government programs often must be if they are to work) with some fortuitous changes in slum life styles, has been to accomplish a dramatic reduction in several cities in the recruitment of new addicts and the death or imprisonment of many old ones.

Were the American public in a mood for celebrating their accomplishments rather than despairing over their failings, the modest, not unmixed, but substantial gains won in coping with heroin might be one such accomplishment. None of these gains were the result of attacking the "root causes" of addiction, however. Indeed, if policy had been made by those who insisted that only elimination of causes is a proper object for public action, methadone would never have been approved for wide clinical use, there would have been little or no law-enforcement effort, and there probably would have been an even greater growth in the size of the addict population.

It is difficult to state in positive terms what lessons I draw from such observations. I recall Reinhold Niebuhr's modest defense of democracy: Man is good enough to make it possible and bad enough to make it necessary. It might be restated thus: Man is refractory enough to be unchangeable but reasonable enough to be adaptable. The institutions of governance created by man reflect his nature. Where an appropriate technology exists and the self-interest of persons can be linked to its operation, there are virtually no limits to what men in organizations can achieve. Where no such technology exists and the inducement is mere piety, there is scarcely anything an organization can do except grow and be meddlesome.

One step men in organizations *can* take is to stop talking and thinking about "crime." Herman Goldstein and Frank Remington at the University of Wisconsin Law School use an analogy to make the point. We do not ask of doctors what they propose to do about "illness," or whether they know of ways to reduce the "illness rate" this year. We ask instead what they propose to do about polio, or cancer, or birth defects, knowing that these are very different problems with (perhaps) totally unrelated causes, and certainly wholly unrelated manifestations. Nor do we say that to "fight illness" we need to put "more doctors on the street"; rather, we say that to prevent polio, a drug can be taken; to reduce birth defects, many different things must be done, many of which involve changing the behavior of the mother rather than simply administering a drug; to cure cancer, almost nothing can as yet be done.

We must think in terms of specific crimes, not "crime." If Thomas A. Reppetto's study is correct, then residential burglaries in low-income housing projects can be deterred, to a degree, by intensive patrolling by police and citizen security units and by mobilizing citizens to report suspicious persons. The reason is that many of these crimes are committed by persons living in the area who move on foot, hit targets almost at random, and are young amateurs. Residential burglaries in middle-class suburbs, on the other hand, may not respond at all to police patrols because, unlike those in housing projects, suburban thefts involve considerable planning by persons living outside the area who find it easy to evade patrols. To reduce (or at least displace) these crimes, household security systems (locks, alarms) may be more effective, coupled with longer sentences for those burglars who are caught.

Whether these prescriptions are right or wrong is less important than the evidence that these two offenses are quite different in circumstance and thus probably not amenable to identical responses, even though both are called "burglaries" and both are "crimes."

Another step is to recognize that most serious crime is committed by repeaters. In a study of nearly ten thousand Philadelphia boys born in 1945, Marvin Wolfgang and his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania found that a few chronic offenders—6%—accounted for *over half* of all the recorded delinquencies and about *two-thirds* of all the violent crimes committed by the entire cohort. In addition to devising strategies tailored to check specific crimes, it is clear we must devote more of the time and resources of prosecutors, courts, and correctional agencies to identifying and incapacitating these 6%. Expending vast energies on "helping" the one-time delinquent is not only likely to be futile, it can produce far fewer benefits for society than promptly isolating the recidivist.

I believe that our society has not done as well as it could have in controlling crime because of erroneous but persistent views about the nature of man and the capacities of his institutions. But I do not believe that, were we to have taken a correct view and as a consequence adopted the most feasible policies, crime would have been eliminated or even dramatically reduced. Given the fact that we cannot in the short run alter many of the demographic causes of rising crime (such as the increased youthfulness of the population), and that even in the long run we will not want to alter other causes (such as our commitment to a secular, consumerist society with greater personal freedoms), I would be surprised if policies informed by such ways of thinking as I have suggested could reduce crime by more than 15 or 20%.

Those who argue than we can eliminate crime if only we have the "will" to do so, whether by ending poverty (as the Left argues) or by putting more police on the street and more gallows in our jails (as the Right believes), therefore seriously mistake what we are capable of under even the best of circumstances. Still, a 15% reduction in crime would mean 60,000 fewer robberies and 375,000 fewer burglaries, and in absolute terms these are not trivial changes. A sober view of man requires a modest definition of progress. I argue that a proper understanding of man and the publicly controllable forces to which he will respond, coupled with only moderate expectations about what can be accomplished under even the best of circumstances, is the essential place to begin any discussion of crime and its control. □

The Great American Saloon Series

by Philip Brantingham

Jimmy's and All That—The University Saloon

University bars were never as good as we remember them to be, and it does no good to go back again. Mory's, The White Horse, or the Sepp'l, the world over, university taverns have an air about them, of childish indulgence, of self-importance, of hokey tradition. In Europe, most university saloons are resorted to for pure drinking and fun; in America, they have a cloying air of pomposity. We pretend that, while sitting and drinking, we are all "being geniuses together." Remember the Twenties in Paris? Thus, in American college saloons are found the ubiquitous chess boards, the little five-foot shelves (usually containing Tynan, Mailer, and Dante cheek by jowl), and the eternal booming of the stereo speakers above one's head.

Around the University of Chicago neighborhood, these days, drinking has gone to the dogs. Taverns were not included in urban renewal, and most of the fabled places have been razed. So much for urban planning. What is left today is but a few memories of a neighborhood famous for its muggings and saloons. And one bar, Jimmy's, which somehow had clout with Chicago's engineers (and ward committeemen), survives.

In my days of residence at the University, there were three college bars, all along the motley length of 55th Street: the University Tap, Freddy's, and Jimmy's. There were others of course: in a slum neighborhood, which was what Hyde Park amounted to, before the wrecker's ball leveled the tenements, bars predominate; but members of the University did well to avoid them. They were rough and tough.

I came to the University in 1952 and lasted until 1957. In that period, the college bars were in their shabby glory, profiting from the sternness of Chicago's curriculum and the cheapness of liquor; if they had anything in common it was their dinginess, the surliness of the barkeeps, and the melancholy of their drunks. Freddy's had at one time been located on Lake Park Avenue, and known as the Compass. It had experimented with improvisation, and its small theater company boasted such youngsters as Mike Nichols and Elaine May, Shelley Berman, and others who went on to Second City. But the Compass had quickly passed into oblivion, and Freddy was forced to move into lower quarters on 55th Street and to abandon theatricals. Only his arguments with customers were dramatic; and customers who disagreed with Freddy's often eccentric notions were asked ne'er to return. Freddy dispensed Ballantine Ale to students and local characters. The atmosphere was one of ruined glory. The Compass became a legend in Chicago, but Freddy could not pay the bills with legendary coin. And he grew unhappy. Eventually, he went to night school and got his teaching certificate. The bar closed in the early sixties and Freddy went into the classroom, expounding from the texts of the Chicago Board of Education.

Like all tavern owners on 55th Street—and much of Chicago, for that matter—Freddy had to contend with the Mafia. To avoid bombings he agreed to take in a jukebox (though he had a hi-fi setup), but he kept the plug pulled on the box and glared angrily at anyone who asked to play it. The cops too harassed the "landlords" for payoffs; when Freddy refused to offer the usual bribe one month, the lads in blue waited until they caught him drinking after hours with his bartenders and arrested him. Freddy however remained contentious and never joined the $100-a-month club.

The University Tap attracted a more genteel crowd, and it was there one was likely to find one's professor drowning his sorrows. It was a dark, dirty little room, the home of problem drinkers. UT, as it was known, had not the glamor of Jimmy's (to which we'll come, shortly) nor the raffishness of Freddy's, and it was rather too sedate for most of the student body. I have two memories of the place: meeting a writer, formerly a student, who was on the brink of suicide (and took the leap a month or so later); and sitting beside my old rhetoric professor, Richard Weaver (*Ideas Have Consequences*). Professor Weaver, on this Saturday night, was alone, and

stared about him at the merrymakers with his myopic eyes. He had a visible longing for human contact. I too longed, to address the great man and "connect" with this fine educator and finer philosopher. Yet the gulf between us, student and professor, was as wide as the Royal Gorge, and I happened to be a terribly shy young man, always somewhat in awe of the faculty (with one exception, the genial and sympathetic David Riesman). So, oppressed by this dilemma, I drank up and left. Shortly after, Weaver died, to everyone's loss.

I have saved for the last the most famous saloon of the era, still functioning, albeit in the midst of urban terror and unsafe streets (how things have *not* changed!): Jimmy's. Only a local historian will care about the family names of these innkeepers, and I do not repeat them for the reader's sake. Jimmy's atmosphere was of unimproved property put to highly profitable use, like a saloon in the Klondike. Jimmy's was a slum of a bar, its dusty board floors occasionally improved with sawdust. It was gloomy, its bartenders sullen, it was of a piece. Its plusses were the excellent hamburgers served and the astounding selection of beers for sale (including Beamish Irish Porter). As the years passed, Jimmy made some additions to the bar, adding a University Room for the college clientele, where, supposedly, one was supposed to show an ID to gain entrance. There are now two University Rooms, both somewhat a step above the older bar. But in today's atmosphere of manslaughter and muggings, these rooms seem an afterthought.

Jimmy's was really, in the fifties and sixties, *the* University of Chicago bar. It also attracted citizens of the *vie bohème*. Socialists, anarchists, and Swedenborgians gathered to enjoy Jimmy's lager. Writers, artists, and failures could be heard boasting about their works in progress. Chess was frequently played, but never did I ever see a single plebeian game of cards. The cries of aesthetic arguments often rose shrilly above the thundering of Beethoven's Ninth (an evergreen in university bars).

Like Freddy, Jimmy had his run-in with the Mob and the Cop. For a time he served Fox Head 400, the Mob's brew (for a time, Tony Accardo served as its chief salesman). Then Jimmy switched to Budweiser, and the famous quarrel with Bud came about; Bud gave no kickbacks on quantity, and Jimmy sold a hell of a lot of beer. So he switched to Schlitz, and the name of Anheuser-Busch became anathema.

As I have said, the atmosphere of Jimmy's was not genteel, save in the more "friendly confines" of the University Room. But after UT and Freddy's passed into history, there was no other place. In truth, one hated Jimmy's. There was a lot of the *Anna Christie* mood there in the afternoons, before the college mob took over. It was not uncommon to see a bartender drinking himself into oblivion after finishing his shift. That is not an encouraging sight.

Others have nothing but raves about Jimmy's, recalling immemorable arguments over Hobbes or intricate investigations of Joyce's *Wake*. Others may remember hobnobbing with university scholars, swapping aphorisms with pedants. I recall none of this: though I met a few of the monuments of Chicago culture, they were chiefly forgettable in their conversations. And I rather think that the profundities of students and assistant professors do not bear repeating, especially after ten years.

I have no intention of leaving the taste of sour grapes in the mouth. Perhaps Jimmy's was (or is) greater than I think. But I, on the whole, am not impressed with saloons as great cultural centers. Had I been in Paris in the Twenties, and entered Lipp's to find Ernest Hemingway busily scribbling in his notebook, I probably would have gone to the other side of the room. University bars, like writers' bars, are possibly the worst places in the world to enjoy a beer. Their only appeal is to snobs and certified alcoholics.

I grow old, of course, and solitary. And that is most likely my problem. But when I recall UT, or Freddy's, or Jimmy's, it is not with nostalgia but with curiosity. Birds of a feather, I suppose, is the last word on this phenomenon. And you see, those are not my feathers. □

E.C. Pasour, Jr.

Protection: Let the Consumer Beware

In the fall of 1974 a proposal to establish an agency to intervene as a consumer advocate in the affairs of other federal agencies was narrowly defeated in the Senate. The vote was a setback for a coalition of labor unions and consumer organizations seeking a new voice for consumers in proceedings before existing regulatory agencies. Sponsors have revived the bill, and this issue continues to be a lively topic of legislative debate in 1975.

Many observers viewed the defeat of the consumer agency bill last year as a setback for consumers and a victory for such groups as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. In reality, however, the issue of consumer protection is not so simple. An analysis of the potential effects of "consumer-oriented" legislation shows that the effects are often quite different from those envisaged by its proponents. Proponents of such legislation often contend that quality improvements can be achieved without any increase in cost. However, there are sound reasons for expecting that legislation concerned with information and regulatory aspects of consumer goods and services will increase costs and restrict the choices available to individual consumers.

First, many if not most regulations ignore a basic principle relating to benefits and costs. Any proposed change is beneficial to society only if the benefits exceed the costs. This principle, though elementary, is frequently ignored in public policy. An excessively high value is assigned to safety or purity seemingly without regard to the cost.

A topical example is the movement to abolish pollution by numerous individuals purporting to protect consumers. For example, the Senate originally passed by a vote of 86 to 0 the Muskie Bill which requires a zero level of discharge of pollutants into the nation's waterways by 1985. The cost of removing an additional unit of pollutant rises rapidly as the zero pollution level is approached. For example, a power company is Pennsylvania spent two million dollars on a facility to remove 98% of the pollutants. The firm had to spend an additional four million dollars to attain a new standard of 99% removal. The cost of attaining a standard of 100% removal (zero pollution), even if technically possible, would typically be astronomical.

In pollution problems of this kind, where acts by one individual involve spillover effects adversely affecting other individuals, there is often a strong case for government intervention. The aim of government intervention in such cases should be to achieve an optimal level of pollution. Thus, pollution should be reduced but only as long as the expected benefits exceed the costs. The cost of removing an additional unit of pollutant, as the above example illustrates, becomes more and more costly as the environment becomes cleaner and cleaner. The cost of removing all pollution to meet a zero tolerance level would almost always far exceed the benefits accruing to society. Thus, a ban on pollution will seldom be the most appropriate remedy. A more appropriate remedy is some measure (such as a tax) to cause polluters to take into account the cost of the undesirable side effects in making production or consumption decisions.

The same principle of comparing benefits and costs is applicable to areas of "consumerism" where spillover effects are not involved. In such cases, regulation or consumer protection must be defended on grounds that consumers have less information than the regulator about the decision to be made by the consumer. There is no strong *prima facie* evidence that this is the case or that benefits exceed costs to consumers from consumer-oriented legislation such as that relating to truth-in-lending, unit pricing of grocery products, and auto safety.

Senator Kefauver's 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provide a good example of the point being made. These amendments were passed largely as a reaction to thalidomide disasters in Europe, but the result has been to attach an extremely high value to safety of new drugs, requiring much stricter standards, including longer testing for approval by the Food and Drug Administration. The legislation ignores the social cost of impeding and delaying the introduction of potentially beneficial new drugs. Indeed, a recent study by Sam Peltzman found that the legislation, in fact, significantly impedes the rate of introduction of new drugs and thus prevents beneficial as well as harmful drugs from entering the market (*Journal of Political Economy*, September/October 1973, pp. 1049-1091). A persuasive case can be made that the alleviation in human suffering due to keeping harmful drugs off the market is more than offset by the suffering which results from not being able to obtain beneficial drugs.

These comments should not be interpreted to mean that consumer risks cannot be reduced. The point is that safer autos, drugs, food, etc. can only be achieved by cost increases, and there is an optimal amount of safety from the consumer's standpoint. We, as consumers, are not interested only in minimizing risks or maximizing product safety. We are also interested in product cost, time and convenience, freedom of choice, etc. A public policy designed solely to minimize risk to human life would have profound implications for auto and bicycle speed limits, the introduction of new drugs, the use of bathtubs, etc. It would also curtail or eliminate many recreational activities where people consciously seek or willingly accept high levels of risk, such as skiing, parachuting, mountain climbing, etc. Indeed, a consumer can only be fully protected in all his actions by abolishing his right to choose. Thus, in assessing the desirability of any proposal to protect consumers, the expected benefits must always be contrasted with the expected costs.

This brings us to the second reason why consumer legislation will restrict the choices of individual consumers. We, as individuals, prefer different amounts of safety or purity in the kind of autos or bicycles we ride, the kind of drugs or food we use, etc. That is, since increases in safety or purity can only be achieved at an increase in cost, we should not expect everyone to desire the same amount of risk (or be willing to pay for the same amount of safety). For example, many people willingly choose to operate a compact car at a lower cost even though they know that the accident rate is higher relative to a larger car. Similarly, the Federal Aviation Agency now imposes minimum safety standards which make air travel safer than auto travel. If consumers were allowed the choice of a somewhat less safe but less costly flight, different people would make different decisions in the tradeoff between risk and cost just as they now do in auto travel.

These examples illustrate the fact that organizations functioning as self-appointed consumer advocates cannot represent the interests of all consumers. Our economy has traditionally relied to a major extent on the market mechanism. One advantage of the market is that it responds to the wishes of people of varying tastes. That is, a freely functioning market will provide a variety of sizes, styles, and costs of autos, drugs, and other products to meet a variety of tastes. Safety and other regulations, on the contrary, usually do not allow for this diversity of tastes.

The role of information differs, to some extent, from the rules and regulations accompanying the consumer movement. One can always contend with justification that consumer information is incomplete. Undoubtedly there are many cases where information is inadequate in the sense that an individual would choose differently if he had more information. Furthermore, it is often difficult for consumers to determine the amounts of risk associated with the use of various goods and services. There is a legitimate and potentially useful role in providing additional consumer information in such cases. However, the same marginal principle relating to costs and benefits applies. That is, additional information is socially desirable only as long as the expected benefits exceed the costs. Furthermore, policy makers quite often apparently feel that even well-informed consumers must be prevented from exposing themselves to risks which the policy makers regard as socially unacceptable. For example, since many auto passengers will not freely use seat belts and other auto safety devices such as air cushion bags, many Congressmen have favored making the use of these devices mandatory.

A final reason why consumer protection will not necessarily be improved by creating a new government regulatory agency hinges on the nature of the regulatory process. Regulatory agencies generally appear to limit or decrease competition instead of protecting the public. The Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, have reduced competition in the air and trucking industries. A recent study estimates that the de-regulation of interstate airlines could reduce passenger fares substantially—by from one-third to one-half (William Jordan, *Journal of Law and Economics*, April 1972, pp. 151-176). The fact that price competition isn't permitted effectively denies airline travelers the opportunity to choose a lower-quality service at a lower price.

The stated purpose of numerous ICC regulations imposing additional costs on truckers serving interstate markets is to prevent "excessive competition." Regulations which require that trucks make return trips completely or partially empty and which forbid companies from shipping by the most direct route are prominent examples. Recent studies have found that costs of carriers exempt from ICC regulations are considerably less than for regulated general freight carriers.

Why do regulatory agencies ostensibly designed to protect the consumer often end up serving the interest of the industry they are supposed to regulate? Though the theory of economic regulation is not now well developed, it seems fairly clear that shortcomings of regulatory agencies do not result from defects of the men in charge. Social, political, and economic pressures largely determine the performance of regulatory agencies. Past experience gives little promise that the basic nature of regulatory agencies can be changed by making them stronger or by putting better men or a better regulatory agency in charge.

Will the consumer be protected in the sense of having a wider range of choice at lower cost with a formal consumer advocacy agency? One must compare consumer protection under competition (the market outcome) with the expected attainable alternative. When one analyzes the effects of past and current regulatory activities ostensibly designed to protect the consumer, such as occupational licensing by the state (barbers, lawyers, etc.) and various regulatory agencies of the federal government (ICC, CAB, etc.), there is little ground for optimism.

The specific authority of any consumer advocacy agency will vary depending upon the legislation enacted. The results of such an agency, however, are quite predictable. Since consumers have a multitude of interests, representation of all consumers is impossible. Thus, a consumer advocacy agency must select those tastes which it will represent. As a result, the consumer will face increased costs and a further limitation on his ability to choose freely among competing products.

The consumer stands to gain more by the elimination of current regulations than from the creation of a new regulatory agency to protect his interests. Competition doesn't always protect the consumer as much as many would like. When compared with protection through regulation, however, market competition is much more likely to accurately reflect a diversity of consumer interests. That is, it is more likely to give consumers what they want instead of what vocal consumer spokesmen feel they should want. □

The Nation's Pulse



by Peter J. Rusthoven

The Mob in Manhattan

April 25th of this year marked the thirtieth anniversary of the historic meeting in San Francisco that established the United Nations. Heeding the call of a communiqué issued by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in February 1945 from Yalta (a conference more memorable for placing half of liberated Europe under Soviet protection), representatives of the victorious nations in World War II met in California to found "a general international organization" that would "maintain peace and security," "prevent aggression," and "remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples." Thus, with a rhetorical flourish worthy of an Albanian Propaganda Minister, the UN was proposed to a war-weary world as its last, best hope for peace.

Although the United Nations has done virtually nothing in the last 30 years to justify the bright hopes expressed at its inception, it retains a place of affection in the hearts of American liberals that is rivaled only by the Social Security system. The UN building in New York is a gleaming monument to cherished beliefs about the inadequacy, in a nuclear age, of a world order rooted in nationalism, a treasured portent of the global government to come. A generation of junior high school students in the postwar era has been taught to view the UN in a similarly rosy light. The organization's occasional successes in "humanitarian" endeavors are trotted out as examples of international cooperation at work. Its failure to deal effectively with almost every crisis of any significance is said merely to illustrate how far we have to go. The petulant anti-Americanism of the so-called "Third World" nations who dominate the General Assembly is dismissed with vague incantations about the need for "tolerance" and "understanding" in our relations with "developing" countries. And above all else, the supposed symbolic value of the institution itself is regularly venerated, as if the United States or world peace would somehow stand jeopardized should the United Nations vanish from the scene.

If the UN were merely a forum for ineffectual but well-meaning career diplomats given to moralistic preachments about events beyond their control, it would, I suppose, be tolerable enough. The United States might then decide that putting an international stamp on periodic charitable ventures, or obtaining whatever psychic satisfaction there may be in having a world organization, justified membership in and financial support for a United Nations. In the last few years, however, the UN has become something more—or rather, something less—than the relatively harmless entity described above. Indeed, I think the time has come to question whether the United Nations an an organization deserves continuing American involvement.

It is clear, to begin with, that judged in light of the sweeping vision articulated at Yalta, the UN is laughably inept. The most laudable stand it ever took to "prevent aggression," *et al.*—Korea—occurred well over twenty years ago, and was predominantly and overwhelmingly a United States, not a UN, endeavor. The very idea of a similar UN undertaking today is preposterous. One need not pause here to recount the long catalogue of buffoonery and/or indifference that has marked the UN's approach to international crises in the days since the Korean War. Suffice it to say that only a naif would have expected anything else. In a 1944 memorandum which he subsequently reproduced in his *Memoirs*, George F. Kennan, hardly an isolationist, aptly summarized why the United Nations would have little effect as an instrument for world peace:

"International life is something organic, not something mechanical. Its essence is change; and the only systems for the regulation of international life which can be effective over long periods of time are ones sufficiently subtle, sufficiently pliable, to adjust themselves to constant change in the interests and power of the various countries involved.... [The] realities of power will soon seep into any legalistic structure which we erect to govern international life. They will permeate it. They will become the content of it; and the structure will remain only the form. International security will depend on *them*: on the realities of power—not on the structure in which they are clothed." From a perspective of three decades, one can fault Kennan only for overemphasizing the degree to which the UN would be even a meaningful structure for the more significant realities.

If one grants that the UN is worthless as a direct peacekeeping force, can one yet defend it as a forum either for international debate or for the articulation of moral positions on important issues? Unfortunately, the quaint conception of reasonable men exchanging views in civilized fashion has seldom found expression in the General Assembly. As William F. Buckley, Jr. notes in *United Nations Journal*, "while as a legislative body [the UN] is useless, and while as a debating body it is invaluable, it does a great deal of legislating and absolutely no debating." In place of debate one hears at best idiotic blandishments like the following gem from the representative of India (quoted by Daniel P. Moynihan in "The United States in Opposition," *Commentary*, March 1975): "The activities of the Soviet delegation at the session showed once again that the Soviet Union deeply understands and shares the aspirations of the Third World." More often, the air is filled with mindless chants against "United States imperialism" and similar ritualistic rot. And at worst, the world is treated to the spectacle of a Yasir Arafat, that brilliant tactician of the war against Israeli children, posturing before a thunderously approving audience with a pistol firmly lodged between his belt and his middle-aged paunch. (Israel was not permitted to respond to this particular demonstration for world peace.) As for articulating moral positions, the record is, if possible, even worse. The UN's latest efforts in this direction include kicking Israel, the villain of the Mideast, out of UNESCO, and expelling South Africa from the General Assembly in direct violation of the Charter. This last action—yet another protest against *apartheid*—was joined, of course, by freedom-loving nations like Uganda, whose incomparable President Idi Amin has expelled white Europeans from his African paradise while expressing his admiration for the racial theories of the late Adolf Hitler.

Finally, one comes to the UN's much vaunted humanitarian endeavors. Surely, the picture is brighter here: after all, who has not warmed with thoughts of international charity after chucking a dollar into the tin can of some young scamp trick-or-treating for UNICEF? However, on reading Professor Moynihan's thoughtful piece in *Commentary*, one discovers that even this field has been permeated with the bombastic, third-rate ideology of the Third World. After a U.S.-sponsored conference on food and population, Professor René Dumont of France cut to the heart of the matter in

Development Forum, an official five-language UN publication: "*Eating little children*. I have already had occasion to show that the rich white man, with his overconsumption of meat and his lack of generosity toward poor populations, acts like a true cannibal, albeit indirectly. Last year, in overconsuming meat which wasted the cereals that could have saved them, we ate the little children of the Sahel, of Ethiopia, and of Bangladesh." Dr. Han Suyin, another heartfelt sympathizer with Third World aspirations, suggests that to solve this problem, "we have to begin by sharing now everything, and that means that a lot of people with a lot of private property, for example, should divest themselves immediately of it in favor of the poor." At the World Food Conference, the Indian food minister added a grace note to this composition by pointing out that whatever the United States does to help in this area should be viewed not as "charity," but as "deferred compensation" for years of capitalistic, imperialistic exploitation.

Moynihan suggests, and wisely so, that it is past time the US began to oppose this nonsense—by trumpeting the achievements of "liberal processes," by asserting "that inequalities in the world may be not so much a matter of condition as a matter of performance," and by ceasing our maddening passivity in the United Nations. Following any of these suggestions would yield a welcome contrast to what one sees today. One question, however, goes beyond Moynihan's criticisms: Namely, at what point should this country simply say "Enough"? The UN today is fairly described as an assemblage of cynical, hypocritical, blathering, and obnoxious representatives from all the corrupt, dictatorial, and pretentious little regimes that dot the globe in this enlightened age. It is little more than an abusive platform for every charlatan in a dashiki or a kaffiyeh who wants to excoriate the United States for the edification of the multinational multitude. It has done almost nothing for the world in years, save for providing an incredible spectacle that would be humorous were it not a slap in the face of decent and civilized men everywhere.

Our mere participation in this assembly of petty tyrants degrades us. That we further legitimize such hijinks by footing over twenty-five percent of the annual bill is but an additional foolishness. Perhaps there is merit in the United Nations that I have overlooked; perhaps the organization is yet salvageable for some purpose or other. But surely we have reached the point where our continued memberhip, much less our support, should no longer be taken for granted as a given of United States foreign policy. At the very least, the record of the mob in Manhattan in recent years should shift the burden of persuasion to those who advocate further affiliation with this institutionalized affront to honesty and dignity in human affairs. I waive consecutive translation and await a response. □

Book Review/Leslie Lenkowsky

Two Cheers for FAP

In this post-Watergate year, a book entitled *Nixon's Good Deed* perhaps deserves appreciation more than review. At a time when bookstores are (or soon will be) glutted with the confessions of sundry ex-convicts, who happen to have been in the employ of the White House, testimony that the Nixon Presidency had its constructive and virtuous moments is almost self-evidently valuable, like a respected character witness at a trial. The book's main author, Vincent J. Burke, was one of those rare Washington journalists who knew something about the issues he reported, and his untimely death left to his wife the task of completing his most important story. If the result is somewhat uneven, *Nixon's Good Deed* should nonetheless help to redress any impression that the White House has, for the last six years, been solely a place of eavesdropping, corruption, and petty burglary.

The "deed" was welfare reform—specifically, the proposal of the Family Assistance Plan in 1969. FAP was a type of negative income tax; it would have guaranteed all families—working or not, united or not, deserving or not—a basic grant ($1600 was proposed for a family of four with no other source of income) and reduced this amount by 50 cents for each dollar earned in order to maintain the incentive to work. The Burkes offer a play-by-play account of how this extraordinary proposal became the major item of domestic legislation of a Republican President and how a coalition of conservatives and liberals twice managed to prevent its enactment.

In the hallowed tradition of the national press corps, internal memos and minutes of private meetings form a sizable portion of the documentation, giving perhaps too much prominence to the work of those unsurpassable leakers, the bureaucrats. Nonetheless, *Nixon's Good Deed* offers fascinating glimpses of how men such as Robert Finch, Daniel P. Moynihan, Arthur Burns, and John Ehrlichman debated the issues and how the President ultimately became convinced that FAP was the right course of action. The Burkes know the issues and, even more, the personalities; they do not hesitate to pass judgment on the deeds and motives of the latter, with particular animus reserved for leading Democrats and labor unionists. Occasionally, they consider broader issues of governing suggested by the events as well as other aspects of the Nixon Administration's domestic proposals, particularly food stamps and the Supplemental Security Income plan, which provides a guaranteed income for the aged and disabled. The emphasis, however, is on telling a story and it is done with admirable conciseness, if not always with accuracy. While one may quarrel with their interpretations or question their selection of events, the Burkes have produced a reasonably informative rendering of policy making in the Nixon White House and have done so without once referring to the Central Intelligence Agency or the "plumbers."

Nixon's Good Deed: Welfare Reform

by Vincent J. Burke
and Vee Burke
Columbia University $8.95

* * *

Although the Burkes account for how the deed occurred, their book is weaker in telling us why the proposal of FAP should be considered a "good" deed. In some quarters, any act of charity towards the poor is inherently virtuous, although no small share of the opposition to FAP came from groups such as the National Council of Churches and other "do-gooders." But this is not the standard the authors use in evaluating FAP, nor is it the way in which the Nixon Administration judged their proposal.

On taking office in 1969, the President and his aides encountered a problem which had the earmarks of a crisis. The number of families receiving public assistance was increasing rapidly with a consequent rise in expenditures—particularly at state and local levels of government—that seemed out of control. In Nixon's first year in the White House, the increment in the welfare rolls—some 750,000 families—was almost as large as

the total number who had been receiving assistance when he left Washington in 1961. The cost of welfare had tripled in that time and now approached—and quickly passed—twelve billion dollars per year. This expansion carried with it an "overtone of social disintegration"; it reflected an increasing number of single-parent families and was especially concentrated among certain ethnic groups and in the core neighborhoods of large cities. Doing something about welfare was almost as inevitable for the incoming Administration as doing something about Vietnam, not least for the potential advantages in both cases of discrediting ill-managed Great Society programs.

The Nixon Perspective

A pre-inaugural task force had recommended the expected, but in its way bold, program of greater federal financing of public assistance, with the implication that more effective national standards should follow. Though initially attractive, this plan was eased aside, partly due to the work of a group of holdover appointees whom the Burkes call a "conspiracy for the poor," but chiefly because the President's aides were interested in a more aggressive approach. Public assistance would be replaced with a wholly new system that would contain incentives for family stability and self-support; after much debate within the Administration on the details, this idea emerged as FAP. Its essential feature was the extension of eligibility to intact families and to those with a full-time breadwinner. Need would thus have become the sole criterion for obtaining assistance, a departure from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the major existing public assistance program, which required the main source of support for the family to be dead, disabled, unemployed, or absent from the home before the aid was given. By supplementing the incomes of people at work, moreover, FAP would provide an incentive to stay employed in areas where existing welfare benefits were competitive with or even exceeded low wages. With social services, job training, and work requirements included in the package, the Administration expected that FAP would reduce dependency at the same time that it alleviated poverty. To the Burkes, the latter may have seemed the more appealing feature of the plan, but there is considerable evidence that the President's oft-repeated desire to replace welfare with workfare was more than just window-dressing for conservatives. The existing system of public assistance, he had concluded, was harmful; "It breaks up homes," he would say. "It often penalizes work. It robs recipients of dignity. And it grows." By doing none of these things, FAP would presumably do good.

Was President Nixon right? Would the enactment of FAP have created a system that could help those in need without encouraging dependency? Much of the critical opposition to the proposal in the Senate Finance Committee stemmed from doubt that it would. In truth, there was no way of being sure then, and not much more evidence now. The wealth of information about American welfare dredged up largely in the wake of the President's proposal confirms the view of critics of FAP that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to design a new system that combines adequate benefits with a financial incentive to work. Although the final results of a negative income tax pilot test in New Jersey demonstrate that such programs do not much weaken the Protestant ethic, they offer no grounds either for expecting that those already receiving welfare will convert to the religion of self-support. Indeed, it is even truer now than in 1969 that the generosity and administrative rules of American welfare make it an attractive alternative to low-wage labor. That is, of course, precisely the case for FAP. But, if anything, the Nixon Administration was not bold enough, addressing only one of the several programs that seemingly make dependency the more desirable condition. Yet from the perspective of the White House, a comprehensive treatment would have been costly and time-consuming, at a time that radical surgery seemed imperative.

The single most appealing feature of FAP was that it was *not* AFDC, a program regarded as so bad that virtually any reasonable alternative was worth trying. When asked what was to be gained by proposing FAP, the President, according to the Burkes, confided to an aide, "We don't know whether this will work, but we can't go on with the present system." Much the same sentiment accounts for its approval on two occasions by the normally cautious House Committee on Ways and Means. As far as it went, this was an accurate judgment, reflecting the best available knowledge of the causes and consequences of the growth of AFDC caseloads. (Indeed, on rereading staff memoranda of the time, it is remarkable just how accurate the analyses of the President's Council on Urban Affairs were.) Yet it was also a flawed perception, shaped by years of inattention to welfare on the part of federal, state, and local officials. No one, in fact, really knew much about AFDC, and those who did—mainly social welfare professionals—seemed at times primarily concerned with protecting their clients' or their own interests. With welfare apparently begetting ever greater dependency, one could perhaps try to salvage AFDC, but this was the preferred strategy of the Great Society and there was little reason to think it could be successful. The real choices seemed limited either to abolishing AFDC altogether—an option oddly neglected even by the redoubtable Arthur Burns—or replacing it with something like FAP.

Six calmer years later, it is easier to see that this view of AFDC as a social disaster was exaggerated. To have some three million young families relying on public charity for their subsistence may not be a healthy state of affairs nor one without implications for the stability of the nation, but it is not a situation attributable in large measure to a particular form of assistance. Although too long neglected and mismanaged, AFDC could have been improved; moreover, the knowledge about welfare generated by the proposal of FAP has qualified the President's indictment of the system.

In Defense of AFDC

"It often penalizes work." Nonetheless, one-fifth or so of all AFDC mothers are either working or in job-training programs. Women in higher-benefit areas do tend to work somewhat less than women in places that pay lower benefits, but the difference is small and complicated by factors such as local job markets, ages of children, and availability of child care. Far from discouraging work, there is now reason to think that AFDC's liberal definitions of work expenses and similar items (which are not counted in determining a client's grant in order to encourage employment) may make working more attractive than necessary! The most important disincentive in AFDC is the much smaller grant to families containing fathers who are unemployed. This program, adopted during the Kennedy Administration, seems to encourage part-time (less than 100 hours per month) employment, so that a recipient could combine welfare and earnings. It differs from FAP primarily by defining need in terms of hours worked rather than income.

"It breaks up homes." Inquiries about family dynamics are no less emotive than when Daniel P. Moynihan first broached the topic in 1965, but with each report from the Census Bureau, it is increasingly apparent that the single-parent family makes up a larger proportion of all poor families and therefore, of those who need welfare. Whether AFDC, in turn, contributes to family-splitting remains a matter of inference, but one recent study concluded that a ten percent rise in welfare benefits would have produced a three or four percent increase in female-headed families. This would have occurred, however, chiefly in areas where wages were low or unemployment high, suggesting that the availability of comparable alternative support, not simply the condition of eligibility, facilitates break-ups. FAP would have removed any compulsion for a father to desert, but so long as some help is likely for the family, there can be no deterrent.

"It robs recipients of dignity." Whatever the stigma traditionally associated with the "poor law," it is now the case that some ninety percent of all families eligible for AFDC are estimated to be receiving benefits. This is an astounding proportion for a program which requires families to apply to a public agency and undergo a screening process.

"And it grows." One consequence of this high proportion is that national

AFDC rolls have ceased to grow (although prolonged unemployment will predictably add families who have exhausted other forms of compensation.) As the Nixon Administration had understood, the rapid growth during the 1960s reflected liberalized administrative rules, higher utilization, and, especially, greater numbers of eligibles due to demographic changes and more generous standards of need. Moreover, the AFDC population is not static; one-fifth of new cases are closed within a year and the likelihood is that two out of three families who leave the welfare rolls will not return. Whatever else the welfare reforms in California, New York, and other states may have taught, it is clear that a diligent government can facilitate this process of exit. In 1969, however, the ardent desire of virtually every state official, including the ex-governor of Maryland, was that welfare, if it was not going to wither away, would at least grow on someone else's vine.

Suggestions for Reform

If AFDC does not discourage work, break up homes, destroy dignity, or grow, there may yet be cause to replace it with a more rationalized system. Decentralized administration makes for a crazy quilt of varying regulations, benefit levels, and services. Though there is still no convincing evidence that these encourage migration to more liberal states, one may object to the prospect of equally needy families in different jurisdictions receiving different kinds of help. Moreover, other welfare programs, for which the same family might be eligible, are likely to be run by different agencies and with different rules and regulations; the net effect might easily be self-defeating and discourage self-support. But it was to these sorts of administrative difficulties that the recommendations of the Nixon pre-inaugural task force were addressed. The successfully-enacted Supplemental Security Income program, the "guaranteed income" for the elderly and the disabled which the Burkes and most other commentators have regarded as a major step forward in American welfare policy, was basically a federalization of existing assistance programs for these groups. If rationalization is the goal, then FAP is not the only means and for political reasons may, in fact, not be the preferable one.

What of the working poor, however, that group of hard-laboring people who can neither earn a sufficient wage nor partake of the generosity of existing welfare programs? Simply federalizing AFDC would not help them at all, and might encourage some, especially in the South, to quit work altogether. Since the proposal of FAP, however, it has become possible for a full-time worker and his family to obtain welfare benefits. Food stamps, the nation's largest assistance program—it is used by more than seventeen million people—provides aid solely on the basis of need, as do, to a lesser extent, public housing and medicaid. But the most significant addition to American social policy—indeed perhaps one of the most important changes since the New Deal—was contained in the recently enacted tax legislation. It created a "work bonus," a small income supplement only for the families of low-paid workers. Just as tax-paying families obtain the benefit of children's tax deductions, those with incomes near or below the tax threshold —and thus, with little or no tax liability— will henceforth receive a special grant through the Internal Revenue Service. Up to an annual income of $4000, the benefit will equal 10% of earnings; beyond $4000 it declines at the rate of one dollar for every ten earned until, at $8000, it disappears entirely. (At that level of income, however, most families are paying taxes.) Initially conceived as a conservative alternative to FAP by Senator Russell Long, the "work bonus" ingeniously avoids the problem of work incentives; where FAP provided the most aid for people who earned nothing, and reduced benefits as they earned more, the "work bonus" increases its assistance as wages rise for most of the low-income range. It is a flexible mechanism—the benefit can be increased by simply raising the proportion of income paid to the wage-earner—and by being confined only to people who work full-time enables them to obtain some of the help available to the person who is not. With the enactment of the "work bonus" the United States has at long last recognized what every other industrial country has known: that a viable welfare program rests ultimately upon its treatment of those who are not dependent.

A Two-Tier Proposal for Welfare Policy

Even so, some will object to the "work bonus" on the grounds that it treats those who work and those on relief separately. Not only could such an arrangement further complicate an already confusing array of programs, but it might also lead to a "two-tier" system, with assistance for the dependent poor inevitably becoming less generous than that for the "deserving" workers. Since the alternatives to work are either charity or starvation, it is not surprising to find that families do, in fact, shuttle between relief and employment (and some combine both). FAP would have created a single system of aid, thereby acknowledging not only this functional relationship but also a social concern of utmost import. The President's Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) had traced urban riots to the racial divisiveness of American institutions, of which welfare seemed a prime example. FAP, instead, proposed to emphasize the commonality of need and thus was not simply a guaranteed income nor just a reform of AFDC, but rather a plan for national reconciliation. For the Burkes, FAP was a "good deed" because it recognized that wages and welfare, and the users of each, went together.

Social purposes, alas, do not always coincide with social reality. The simple truth is that the poor who generally work and the poor who usually receive public assistance do come from different populations and have rather different prospects. What is most characteristic of the working poor is that they tend not to be poor very long; their incomes fluctuate with their health, age, ability to work full shifts, and normal demographic changes. (Having a first child, for example, may move a family temporarily into poverty not only because there is an extra mouth to feed, but also because the family is without the mother's earnings for some period afterwards.) The chronic poor are the elderly, the disabled, and those who live in female-headed families, precisely the groups which are aided by the existing welfare system. Each group may need nothing more than money, but unless part of a general attempt at redistribution, programs to aid the working poor might better aim at maintaining a particular level of earnings, while those for the dependent poor should be designed to replace income, perhaps for a prolonged period. In practice, this may mean, for the employed, not only efforts to increase wages or decrease taxes, but also extension to the lowliest jobs the perquisites of the better ones: health insurance, sickness benefits, pension schemes, and the like. For those not in the labor force, public policy should continue to improve existing aids, such as AFDC, and also pay more attention to the problems of transition from work to welfare and back. Treating both groups as if they *only* had the same need—money—cannot help but result in programs which assist neither one very well.

This two-tier approach to welfare policy is doubtless more complicated and less elegant, and probably more costly, than a single comprehensive scheme such as FAP. Yet, in a society as complex as the United States, whether simplicity is a virtue may properly be questioned, especially since the issues of welfare policy will almost certainly shift during the next few years. If the first part of the decade was concerned with the dependent, the second half is already vexed with the unemployed, a group lacking neither experience in the labor force nor the wherewithal to earn a decent wage. To view them as yet another impoverished group is both the compassionate and necessary thing to do, but whether aid is to come through a single system of relief or the more traditional forms of job-related compensation will have consequences both for the recipients and the economy as a whole. In presenting the case for one program, the Nixon Administration provoked a long overdue debate on the nature of American welfare policy. FAP was, in that sense, surely a "good deed." But it may not be a good model. □

The Public Policy

by Adam Meyerson

Flummoxing the Fuel Question

A recent headline in the Sunday *New York Times* announced that the urban crisis is over, thus giving official recognition to a change in consciousness that had previously gone unnoticed. I say change in consciousness, because life in our cities has not substantially improved these last few years; indeed in some respects, for instance municipal finance, it may be fairly described as having deteriorated. But a crisis, by definition, cannot last forever and, besides, we have been afflicted by new woes and threats. A people struggling to survive the ravages of unemployment, sex discrimination, and massive police surveillance cannot be bothered by such trifles as the crisis in our cities.

The temper of our times culls up so many crises that it is difficult to say just which of our problems is most critical today. Nevertheless, if *the* crisis of the sixties was the unbearable condition of our cities, and *the* crisis of the eighties will be Russian military domination, surely a prime candidate for *the* crisis of the seventies is what has characteristically come to be known as the energy crisis. The dimensions of the problem go beyond last year's Arab oil embargo, with its attendant shortages, and the possibilities of its being repeated. Instead, it is suggested that some of our most important energy resources, particularly domestic oil and natural gas reserves (excluding shale), could run out by the end of the century; that the exploitation of more plentiful energy sources—coal, nuclear reactors, and foreign oil reserves—will not only become much more costly but will pose dangerous threats to the environment, to health, and to the balance of payments; and therefore, that acceptable sources of energy will not be able to supply us with enough fuel to meet our needs at the rate they are growing. Although the severe shortages will not arise until the future, the crisis is said to be immediate, because now is the proper time, and perhaps the last opportunity, to make the necessary plans to avert them.

Crisis requires resolute policy, and a number of scientists, foundations, businesses, and government agencies have been quick to come forth with their suggestions for urgent action. Many policy proposals have focused on developing new sources of supply—the answer lies with coal or breeder reactors or solar energy, varying according to one's perspective and one's pocketbook. But recently, attention has been addressed to the idea of forestalling shortages by reducing consumption, or at least its growth. Until the embargo, American energy consumption had been growing at a rate of 3.4% a year since 1950 (4.5% since 1965); and in 1974 major studies sponsored by the President's Council on Environmental Quality, by the Ford Foundation, and by the Committee for Economic Development all called for government action to reduce that growth rate—to 1.4%, 2%, and 2.9% respectively.

Now our long-term energy prospects may well be grim, and the need to prepare for them by conservationist efforts may well be urgent. There is the danger, however, that those who use the rhetoric of urgency may actually be pulling some fast ones on us. As the journal *Science* has written, "Achieving a targeted rate of energy growth...implies involvement in economic planning and management well beyond what Western governments are used to." So we would be wise, before we rush headlong into government policies designed to set a lower rate of energy growth, to understand a little better just what we are getting into.

The Institute for Contemporary Studies (San Francisco) has just published an instructive little book to help us in this understanding, by offering some timely caveats about the energy crisismongers. *No Time to Confuse*, organized by J. Clayburn LaForce, Jr. of the UCLA economics department, is a collection of ten essays by economists, political scientists, and engineers, each criticizing aspects of *A Time to Choose*, the major report issued last year by the Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project. While the Ford Foundation report has some virtues as well as pitfalls, and while some of the critical essays suffer from rhetorical excesses of their own, *No Time to Confuse* nevertheless deals up valuable reproaches to much of the conventional wisdom which the Ford Foundation report typifies. *A Time to Choose* is itself exercising uncalled-for influence in Congress—much of the energy legislation now emerging from the House Ways and Means Committee comes straight from its pages, and project director S. David Freeman is a major consultant for Congressional energy committees—but without going into the specifics of the Ford report, let us see what admonishments supplied by *No Time to Confuse* can apply more generally to discussions of energy and of the calls for resolute action.

1.) Like many current commentators, the Ford Foundation report calls for a coherent, centralized energy policy. Our present decisions are made by a variety of private industries and of uncoordinated government bodies—the Department of the Interior, different Congressional committees, different regulatory agencies—and as a result the decisions are often inconsistent and drifting. But in the urgency of an energy crisis, according to *A Time to Choose*, "drift is surely the worst of the alternatives before us." "Some choice is better than none."

Very well, reply the authors of *No Time to Confuse*, there may be some advantages to consistent and concerted energy policy. But, as William H. Riker points out in his splendid essay "The Ideology of *A Time to Choose*," there is a very good reason why our policies are inconsistent: our goals and values are inconsistent. We want cheap and plentiful energy, national self-sufficiency, and a clean environment—all legitimate but incompatible desires—and since different groups have different preferences with different intensities at different times, it would be impossible for a democratic society to arrive at a coherent, long-term policy. It would not be impossible for an authoritarian society, but that is precisely the point: a coherent energy policy must be undemocratic, for it is only by straitjacketing divergent points of view that a uniform policy could be maintained.

2.) The authors of *A Time to Choose* argue that we can cut back our pace of energy consumption and still maintain our rate of economic growth. This is so, they say, because we could use energy more efficiently (e.g., better gasoline mileage, better insulation) with little economic cost. And therefore, they advocate regulations and tax incentives for more efficient energy use.

To this, the authors of *No Time to Confuse* reply that technical efficiency does not necessarily mean social efficiency; in the words of Arnold B. Moore, "two equal national incomes will not be equally preferred by consumers." For example, it may be most efficient, technically, to drive at 55 m.p.h., but some people value speed more than mileage efficiency; they would rather drive at 70 m.p.h. and pay the extra fuel expenses. Technical efficiency does not always satisfy consumer preferences most effi-

ciently, and to legislate technical efficiency is to unduly restrict consumer choices.

3.) *A Time to Choose* calls for the establishment of an Energy Policy Council in the Executive Branch to make sure that "each sector of the economy [achieves] the lowest possible energy requirements subject to economic efficiency." If the record of similar government agencies is any indication, reply the authors of *No Time to Confuse*, such a Council is likely to forget those words "subject to economic efficiency," and the achievement of energy efficiency will lead to worse inefficiency elsewhere. As George Hilton explains, the world is full of shortages and "energy simply isn't the only thing worth economizing." Storm windows may reduce fuel bills, but they also use up valuable aluminum; at some point, therefore, it is inefficient to put up storm windows even if they do save some energy.

4.) The authors of *A Time to Choose* recognize that as energy prices increase, demand for energy decreases; but they nevertheless have little faith in the market to further their conservationist purposes. For example, they doubt that "major savings from improved mileage for automobiles can be achieved on the most rapid timetable without supplementing market forces with specific performance requirements or tax incentives." This becomes an argument for extensive meddling in the economy.

In response, the authors of *No Time to Confuse* say this is an empirical question, and so far evidence supports the market as an effective mechanism for conserving scarce resources. Thus, Thomas G. Moore cites several recent econometric studies showing that gasoline consumption decreases about 7% with a 10% price increase. The Ford Project itself commissioned a major study of the oil industry and was surprised to find that it was indeed competitive and price-responsive; according to the authors of *No Time to Confuse*, similar conclusions would probably be reached from a study of the auto industry. (Just recently, the auto industries announced that their 1977 cars would return to the weight of the 1950s, clearly a fuel economy measure.) If consumers and manufacturers are already being induced by rising prices to use fuel more efficiently, then the kinds of regulations the crisismongers have in mind will be not only coercive but also unnecessary, and will conserve more energy than is desirable.

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As the members of the Ford Foundation Project correctly point out, there are a number of energy decisions which cannot be left to the marketplace. Market prices do not reflect the environmental and health costs of energy production, and although social costs can be included in the costs of production by taxation, government must determine when and how much to tax for social costs. The market will not keep fuel reserves necessary for defense in the case of foreign embargoes; government will therefore have to establish stockpiles or other forms of emergency protection. Defense and safety consideration require extensive government regulation of nuclear energy production. Finally, over half America's onshore and offshore energy resources are on government properties, and government must decide at what rate to lease those properties for exploitation.

Government therefore has a necessary role in energy decisions, but as *No Time to Confuse* instructs us, there are those among us who would use the rhetoric of crisis to expand government power in ways that are authoritarian, inefficient, and unnecessary. Let us be on our guard, and let us bear in mind that in a few years the *New York Times* might very well announce the passing away of yet another crisis. □

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

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Is This Any Way to Write a Book?

If someone hadn't been so foolish as to translate Freud's German neuter *es* into the Latin *id* (instead of the English *it*), the world might have been spared much of Mr. Cuddihy's eccentric foray into alien ideologies. Actually, Freud borrowed the term from *The Book of the It*, by George Groddeck, who, in turn, attributed the concept to Nietzsche. But in *The Ordeal of Civility*, we are submerged in an "id-Yid" parallel which, when it is not offensive, is downright silly. Served up some 15 times while our author analyzes Sigmund Freud on a couch of rusty nails, we are told—with giant and humorless chutzpah—that "the id of the 'Yid' is hid under the lid of Western decorum"; that the "importunate 'Yid' released from ghetto and *shtetl* is the model for Freud's coarse, importunate, id," exceeded in *"id-Yiddishkeit"* only by Karl Marx and almost matched by the third "Jewish giant" of our modernity—Claude Levi-Strauss.

One of the fresher insights that has attracted much innocent attention to Cuddihy's theme is his notion that "for intellectual Jews the price of admission to European secular culture was a costly conformity to the manners and social rites of the gentiles—a price so high that the most brilliant and original thinkers among the Jews refused to pay it." Instead, they tried to do in genteel society and became socialists, Zionists, and psychoanalysts!

But to elaborate his thesis Cuddihy indulges in homely Yiddish words and phrases, almost always misused or misunderstood. He speaks in slurs, as when he says Hannah Arendt's "perverse" dissent from the Supreme Court's "desegregation" decision of 1954 was colored by her "European Jewish background." Finally, he shows little understanding of any of the intellectual trends he writes about. Thus, in his "socioanalysis" of Freud we are enlightened on *Cuddihy's* analytic method: "As one enters the analytic situation one must check one's manners and morals at the door. All rules—of syntax, of morality, or propriety—are to yield to the primary rule of saying whatever comes to mind." This is a rude disquisition on "free association," but Cuddihy is not himself anti-Jewish or even anti-Freud. He is only woefully mistaken in his assumptions and his understanding.

Acting on his own conception of what the "analytic situation" is all about, he resorts to the style made famous during the period of "socialist realism" under Stalin. I refer to the "it's no accident" school of polemics. Cuddihy tells us that it is "no accident" that Wilhelm Reich, the orgonist (identified as "Reich I") and Charles "Greening" Reich (whom he describes as "Reich II") came to almost identical conclusions, which I do not intend to burden the reader with, except to note that Dr. Cuddihy is not so insensitive as to include the *Third* Reich in his catalogue of Reichs. We learn that, like the "lachrymose" *Ostjuden* (East European Jews), Jewish intellectuals all bewail their plight at being unable to fit into the dominant culture of the West with its elaborate codes of politeness, civility, and morals. And it is against this exclusion—this objection to being identified as a "pariah people," as Max Weber called them—that they set about inflicting on Western civilization not only Marxism, or "scientific socialism," but also "psychoanalysis" and "Zionism."

The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity

by John Murray Cuddihy
Basic Books $11.95

That Marx despised *shtetl* Jewry, the Jews of East Europe, whom he abused as the "filthiest of all races"; that he tried desperately to disown his own Jewish past; that he wanted "a world without Jews," as one translation of his essay on the "Jewish Question" is titled; that he formulated a socioeconomic doctrine which, he stated, "would make being a Jew impossible"; all this Cuddihy sees as a sign that Marx was *not* an anti-Semite, that he was merely expressing his *shtetl-Yiddish* contempt for bourgeois society with its false values, etc.

Fortunately for our author, he is convinced that his readers will not read him too carefully. Thus he is able to talk of Marx's "scientific socialism," at the same time depriving Marx's co-discoverer of the common doctrine—Friedrich Engels—of a place among the socialist elect. In this connection the overt—pure-at-heart—anti-Semite is more to be trusted. He (the anti-Semite) is "a sadist with a pure heart," Sartre writes. "What he prepares for, what he wishes is the *death* of the Jew." (Emphasis in original.) Thus, when the Hitlerian intellectual F.C. Wegg-Prosser wrote in the British *Fascist Review* his low estimate of the Jewish-Marxist conspiracy known as "scientific socialism," he blithely coopted Engels into the faith of Marx's grandfathers and called him a "Jewish capitalist."

Cuddihy also sees socialism in all its manifestations as a Jewish continuum ranging from "Marx, Lassalle, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Bernstein" to "Walter Lippmann." Here is a socialism (to start from Cuddihy's vantage point) without Engels, Liebknecht (the elder), Bebel, Kautsky, Liebknecht (Karl), Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin—and Norman Thomas.

I do not want to suggest that this kind of writing may give comfort to all home-grown *Judenfresser*—they don't need Cuddihy's intrusion into this stale dust to fortify their contempt. But (I think) they will not be too ungrateful. Nevertheless, to prove his evenhandedness we get a short "Ike and Mike" chapter titled "The Irish and the Jews" where he points to a couple of Irish Bowery derelicts to demonstrate his conviction that "all stereotypes are, more or less, accurate."

As the author closes in on his theme—stretching it at times to absurdity—we get a 12-page dissertation on Levi-Strauss; a "Tale of Two Hoffmans" (Judge Julius and Abbie), a parable so vulgar I spare the reader the details; something about "Jews and Blacks and the Cold War at the Top"; plus a summary chapter titled "Modernity, Jewry, Christianity," in which we are exposed to more nonsense than should be allowed even an associate professor of sociology at one of New York's open-admission colleges (Hunter).

It is my conviction that Levi-Strauss was thrown into this non-kosher Mulligan stew of a book only because the hyphenated anthropologist wrote a work on *The Origin of Table Manners* which, for all the wrong reasons, Cuddihy thinks is a masterpiece. Actually, and despite his own pious self-assertion, Levi-Strauss' ethnology runs counter to Marx's and Engels', which was based on Lewis H. Morgan's optimistic, low-to-high assumption of unilinear evolution. "It's not for nothing" (Cuddihy writes that way!), we are informed, that Levi-Strauss' *The Raw and the Cooked* deals "with the ancient theme of Diaspora intellectuality... [and that] echoes of Marx and Freud can be heard in Levi-Strauss' obsession with the raw, the coarse, the vulgar, the naked and their transformation-mediation-sublimation into the cooked, the refined, and the clothed."

To call this nonsense would be generous; to say that it is silly would be underestimating the author's capacity for arrogance. But for sheer High Chutzpah, I offer the Professor's submergence into what he calls "Jewish literature." Here we learn that in 1853 "there appeared a novel" (Mapu's *The Love of Zion*) which "constituted for its Jewish readers their 'first introduction to the very concept of literature as such.' But, in general, the idea of fiction has remained a stranger to the world of *Yiddishkeit.*" One: Mapu's novel was written in Hebrew which then had fewer Jewish readers than there are readers today of Gaelic novels. Two: at least a dozen years before Mapu's

'novel'' appeared, Israel Aksenfield's *Dos Shtern-tichel* (*The Kerchief*) was enthralling ''Jewish readers'' in the *shtetlach* of East Europe and wherever else Yiddish was spoken and read. And three: Jews have been reading ''fiction'' as long as the *goyim*—probably longer.

We may dismiss his absurd notion that when the *Ostjuden* came to New York City they set up a ''Lower Side system.'' That's a system? Is that a nice way for a college boy to write? But to give Cuddihy his due, we must let him tell it in his own way. Unrecognizable names should not deflect the essence of his message. They are, for the most part, dragged in out of time and place of national origin. It's the author's tone and temper than needs final elucidation: ''From Solomon Maimon to Norman Podhoretz, from Rahel Varnhagen to Cynthia Ozick, from Marx and Lassalle to Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel, from Herzl to Freud to Harold Laski and Lionel Trilling, from Moses Mendelssohn to J. Robert Oppenheimer [may the Lord have mercy on us, the Rosenbergs are missing!] and Ayn Rand, Gertrude Stein, and Reich I and II (Wilhelm and Charles)''—but blessedly not Reich III—''one dominating structure of an *identical* predicament and a shared fate imposes itself upon the consciousness and behavior of the Jewish intellectual in *Galut*.... They examine this [Western] world in dismay, with wonder, anger, and *punitive* objectivity. This wonder, this anger, and the *vindictive* objectivity of the marginal nonmember are recidivist: they continue unabated into our own times....'' (My emphasis)

In sum, what Cuddihy is telling us in his elaborate and often incoherent text, is that the Jew—in his ''struggle with modernity''—is unable to cope with the civility society demands as a price for admission. That is the Jew's ''ordeal.'' And no matter how much he tries, no matter what he believes, thinks, says—be he Liberal or Conservative, Rightist or Leftist—he will never grasp the Protestant *Etiquette* even if he is prepared to practice the Protestant *Ethic*: he will never be Patriot but Pariah.

One final remark: England has an honorable place for its eccentrics. I do not think America is yet prepared for them. Mr. Cuddihy probably means well. But meaning well is not enough. Saying it well is. □

The Business of America

by George H. Pearson

Investment in Ideas

(This essay has been adapted from a speech given by Mr. Pearson at the Discussion Club in St. Louis.)

Most businessmen have a well-thought-out philosophy guiding them in conducting the affairs of their businesses. Fewer have been as thorough in conceiving a philosophy on charitable contributions, and this, I think, has serious consequences for businessmen. I should like to share some of my thoughts and experiences on this matter in the hopes that they might be helpful.

For the purpose of argument, let me assume that the goal of most businessmen is a free enterprise society, although I will not assume that all businessmen will agree on what a free enterprise society really is. For some, it is what we now have; only additional government intervention would be a socialist imposition on our free enterprise system, or a change from it.

But what we now have is an interventionist society. We must *re-establish* a free enterprise society in order to have one. I am not conservative in wanting to preserve what we now have—what we have is government intervention. Preservation, in this case, means the preservation of an interventionist system.

This is a position that I have come to share with my associates, first at the Koch Foundation and later at the Institute for Humane Studies.

The Koch Foundation is a small family foundation with an annual disposable income of a few hundred thousand dollars. When we started we were quite concerned about how to spend those dollars effectively toward our goal. We were concerned about our money being lost in a sea of government funds and the more substantial disbursements of the much larger foundations. So we looked for the point of leverage.

We did not think that political spending would be the most effective use of our income. Anticipating the Tax Reform Act of 1969, we thought it would be frowned upon by the Internal Revenue Service. Besides, we did not see politicians as setting the prevalent ideology, but rather as reflecting it. There are those whose feelings about politicians are more adamant than what I've expressed. Was it Mencken who said that changing politicians was analogous to changing madams in a house of ill repute?

Nor did we feel we could change the world by informing or trying to persuade great numbers of people. If I could afford enough time on television and the services of skilled advertising experts, I could probably win any key issue, political or otherwise. But our foundation did not consider that approach as being realistic for our very limited resources.

The third possible course was to influence those Professor F.A. Hayek calls the intellectuals. Hayek contends the prevalent ideology is set by the intellectuals: teachers, preachers, journalists, lecturers, publicists, newswriters and commentators, writers of fiction, cartoonists, artists, and all others who disseminate ideas.

So the foundation decided to pursue the point made by Hayek in his booklet *The Intellectuals in Socialism*, or for those who prefer autobiography to theory, by Beatrice Webb in her book *Our Partnership*. This story of the Webbs provides a unique lesson in the influence which a sound, methodical strategy can achieve. In the words of one critic of this work, ''The strongest impression left by Beatrice Webb's memoirs is that she and her husband owed the extent of their influence largely to, among other things, fully understanding and knowing how to make use of, the decisive position which the intellectuals occupy in shaping public opinion.'' They set out not ''to organize the unthinking person into a socialist society'' but ''to make the thinking people socialistic.'' The Webbs knew that the way to influence politicians was indirectly. They looked forward to the day when ''hosts of young men, well-trained in Fabian economics and administrative lore would be crawling into the political arena.'' They *did not* try to reform politicians.

But, ironically, it is my observation that it is easier to raise money for political

candidates than it is to raise money for public policy issues, and it is still more difficult to raise money for fundamental research and writing of the kind engaged in by the Webbs—the kind that ultimately determines the prevailing ideology.

This seems to me to be just the reverse of what it ought to be. It also seems to me to be an inconsistency. Businessmen realize the principles of leverage and long-term investment in business, but not in ideas. Unfortunately, the socialists do not fail to recognize and emphasize what the capitalists do not.

The reason is that businessmen and others do not turn their attention to the situation until it is bad. Then, once alarmed, only short-run measures seem appropriate. So, advocates of the free market tend only to fight grass fires that are constantly around us. But there is no end to the increasing number of new fires that spring up daily.

Let me try to illustrate this point. Wage and price controls are known to be unworkable. But why do they keep raising their ugly head? There exist hundreds of other such specific interferences in the market that are known to be detrimental. Why then can't we keep them from being implemented or get rid of them once they have been implemented?

My idea is that we have tended to accept other notions which cause us to betray ourselves. The best example that comes to mind is the almost total acceptance of egalitarian philosophy. Such a philosophy of "fairness and justice" overrides objections to inadequate programs.

So for rational reasons and with proof of bad experience we may want to get rid of a specific program but for the "good of society" or some other fundamentally egalitarian concept we must go along.

Now I suggest that we strive to undermine such false underlying concepts which make victories over specific policy programs temporary or of little significance.

This is an intellectual war that takes years to fight. It took years to bring this country around to believing that government could solve problems better than the market, and it will take years to get rid of that destructive notion. Belief that government participation is necessary or helpful and that governments are always beneficial must be challenged.

Our foundation and the Institute adhere to that unglamorous, long-run approach which is essential to return freedom to us.

I'm not saying that efforts at the other levels are not important—they are. I am saying that without the necessary effort at the intellectual level, nothing else will succeed.

Without capturing the intellectual community, efforts such as the one made by M.A. Wright, chairman of Exxon, will be turned against us. I refer to John Kenneth Galbraith's new book, *Assault on Free Enterprise* (*New York Times Book Review*, September 15, 1974).

My advice to the business community can be summarized as follows: If you are interested in an ultimate victory you would be well advised to make an all-out effort to determine what influences and directs the course of events. You may come to a different conclusion than I, or interpret your findings differently, but I doubt it.

As Hayek said, "Unless we can make the philosophical foundation of a free society once more a living issue, and its implementation a task which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds, the prospects of freedom are indeed dark." □

Book Review/Robert Asahina

Invasion of the Body Snatchers

The emergence of modernism in the arts stimulated new controversies among cultural critics, and the distinction between "highbrows" and "lowbrows" was transformed from merely a descriptive categorization into the weaponry of cultural polemics. The classical statement of high-culture partisanship was made by Clement Greenberg in his famous essay, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch." Greenberg argued that the art of Picasso, Joyce, Eliot, and others constituted an elite, advanced culture—made possible by a "superior consciousness of history"—whose very existence was threatened by the presence of mass, popular culture, which represented the dialectical opposite of the avant-garde in the historical movement of culture.

It has been 35 years since the first appearance of Greenberg's article. Fortunately, cultural criticism, unlike Art Deco, has not yet become an object of the current wave of nostalgia for the thirties. Unfortunately, the lessons of the problematic encounter with modernism in the arts seem to have been as quickly forgotten as those learned from the equally troublesome encounter with Marxism. In 35 years, the New Criticism has long since succumbed to other modes—the New Journalism and the New Sensibility, among others; the fellow travellers of Stalin have long since been succeeded by those of Castro, and then Mao; and modernism has long since ceased to be contemporary. Fashions do change, of course—and with a rapidity that is often the surest clue to their significance and depth. And intellectual fashions are no less free from faddism than are hemlines.

Perhaps the most significant of the changes in intellectual fashion has been in the attitude taken by cultural critics toward popular culture. It had been long suspected that popular and high culture were more continuous than diametrically opposed, but the high-minded contempt of popular culture found in Greenberg's essay now seems to have been replaced by *its* opposite: a peculiar low-minded indulgence masquerading in academic garb as high-minded seriousness. At a time when *auteur* critics have rediscovered Howard Hawks, an editor of *Partisan Review* has resurrected the early works of Dashiell Hammett, and Anna Moffo is packaged as a "superstar"; Herbert Gans, professor of sociology at Columbia and sometime film critic for *Social Policy*, has written a lengthy and detailed "analysis and evaluation of taste," which, in the name of cultural pluralism, defends popular culture against its high culture critics.

Popular Culture and High Culture

by Herbert Gans
Basic Books $10

The irony of writing such a book when the cultural situation of the seventies would seem to demand just the opposite sort of "defense" seems not to have eluded Gans entirely—but he argues that, regardless of the current state of culture, the rise of egalitarianism and the decline in the status of intellectuals might prompt a revival of the kind of critique of popular culture that was common in the fifties. Although his argument for the imminence of such a revival is unpersuasive, Gans does raise the central cultural question of modernity: the problem of the compatibility of liberal democracy and elite culture.

Now Gans purports to be a "socialist, egalitarian sociologist," but there is something curious about the cultural pluralism which he professes to advocate. He argues *against* a policy of "cultural mobility" (i.e., against encouraging tastes to rise along with class advancement through socioeconomic mobility) and *in favor of* a policy of "subcultural

programming" (i.e., encouraging the fashioners of culture to cater fully to the existing tastes of each public in the "taste hierarchy"). And thus Gans seems to be acceding to something in the cultural sphere that he would not tolerate in the political sphere—a stratification of society along class lines, without even the means to rise from one level to the next.

Gans has been driven to this odd position largely, I suspect, out of frustration that both the taste hierarchy and the class structure have proved so stubbornly resistant to attempts at reform from above. Moreover, because a rise in the level of taste does not necessarily follow from a rise in class status (as he notes, even those who have "made it" often bring with them the cultural values of their previous station in life), Gans can accept the taste hierarchy at the same time that he attacks the class structure—especially since he regards cultural reform as much less important than social and economic reform.

This tactical move of subordinating the cultural to the political has been the characteristic response of twentieth century socialism to the problems posed by modernism in the arts. It was this very threat of the Cultural Commissars to the autonomy of art that dispelled, for some cultural critics in the thirties, the seemingly natural faith in the compatibility of artistic and political vanguardism: One result was the separation of *Partisan Review* from the sponsorship of the Communist John Reed Club; and Greenberg's essay makes little sense unless considered in this context.

As it became increasingly clear that cultural and political radicalism were not natural allies, but ultimately natural enemies, other critics took the position opposite that of Greenberg and his *Partisan Review* colleagues: Instead of maintaining a commitment to modernist elite culture and (gradually) sacrificing political radicalism, they chose to sacrifice high culture.

So Gans' strategy is not new. What is new is his approach: In effect, he solves the problem with an analysis that obscures the crucial issues. Although he concedes that the higher taste cultures are "better or at least more comprehensive" than the lower ones, he also argues "that the evaluation of any taste culture must also take its taste public into account, that the evaluation of any item of cultural content must be related to the aesthetic standards and background characteristics of the relevent public, and that to the extent that all taste cultures reflect the characteristics and standards of their public, they are equal in value. In other words, I do not believe that all taste cultures are of equal worth, but that they are of equal worth when considered in relation to their taste publics." Or, "you pays your money, you takes your choice." Or, "different strokes for different folks."

It is important to realize just what kind of sociological sleight of hand is taking place in this move from "I do not believe that all taste cultures are of equal worth" to "they are of equal worth when considered in relation to their taste publics." The reduction of value to taste in aesthetics is analogous to the reduction of merit to praise in ethics. By insisting that the final evaluation of the worth of a given taste culture must take into consideration its appropriate taste public, Gans is blandly denying that art—elite or otherwise—has any value on its own terms. But the question of the autonomy of art is precisely what is at issue.

Moreover, by analyzing taste publics as "users" of their respective taste cultures, Gans has succeeded in bringing about *by definition* precisely the kind of "leveling" that high culture critics have always feared that popular culture would bring about by itself, without benefit of an intellectual defense. By regarding all taste cultures in terms of their *lowest* common denominator—that they can be "used" to satisfy the needs and desires of their respective taste publics—Gans has built his answer into his analysis. It is a mistake, as Gans rightly notes, for partisans of high culture to regard popular culture as monolithic in character. But instead of being sensitive to the nature of each of the different taste cultures, Gans has compounded that mistake by calmly regarding *all* of them as monolithic. He has managed the trick of retaining democratic choice—including the choice of high culture—while dismissing the threat of elite culture. But his analysis gives little credit to either high or popular culture.

* * *

It would be a foolish defender of high culture who chose to criticize Gans on his grounds, since the deck is so obviously stacked in Gans' favor. It might be better to consider as a parable an example chosen from the very popular culture which Gans purports to defend: the 1956 horror movie, *The Invasion of the Body Snatchers*, in which creatures from outer space grow out of vegetable-like pods, and take over the bodies and assume the identities of the inhabitants of a small California town. Only one man manages to resist, and ultimately to escape, what he recognizes as the horror of their "bodysnatching": the replacement of people by a society of beings, devoid of emotions, who live without individuality, competition, or strife in efficient, egalitarian, and rational harmony.

Now, a partisan of high culture who suggested than Gans might find in this movie an interesting comment upon the nature of mass culture and its attendant undifferentiated consciousness might be guilty of the same kind of patronizing overintellectualization which is characteristic of Gans' own reviews (see his review of *Chinatown* in the November issue of *Social Policy*). But an interpretation of the movie is less interesting than a story *about* the movie.

The director of the film, Don Siegel, intended to finish it with a sequence showing the hero, who has managed to escape,

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standing in the middle of the highway leading from the town, trying in vain to warn the passing motorists, who naturally take him to be insane. The producers, however, insisted upon adding a framing sequence with an ending which showed the hero finally convincing The Authorities of the danger—in one of those artificial coincidences which moviemakers too often substitute for authentic suspense, his story is confirmed by an automobile collision involving a truck which is transporting more pods from the town for distribution throughout the state. In this case, by ensuring that the movie pod-people would lose, the real-life pod-people—the studio executives—won.

The real losers, of course, were the movie audiences—and anyone who appreciates a piece of fine craftsmanship. Popular culture has some peculiar strengths—not the least of them is the very resiliency which always has seemed to obviate the need for an intellectual defense: for the most part, the millions of fans who went to see *Airport* or *The Exorcist* did not care what the critics thought of their choices.

But popular culture also has some peculiar weaknesses—perhaps the greatest is its susceptibility to the kind of cynical or insensitive tampering which spoiled much of what was best in *The Invasion of the Bodysnatchers*. But Gans' policy recommendations suggest an even more sophisticated kind of meddling: The business of "implementing subcultural programming" involves "(1) identifying all relevant taste publics and cultures and their aesthetic standards; (2) determining the publics which are currently poorly served with cultural content meeting their standards; and (3) creating the needed culture." Although Gans does not specify who will do the "programming"—a term which he admits that he appropriated from the mass media industry—it seems evident that it will be the members of his academic field.

But why should he believe that sociologists, armed with the latest in computer hardware and methodology, will come up with anything different from what we already have, courtesy of the Nielsen people—a spinoff of "All in the Family" for every combination and permutation of ethnic, political, and sexual categories? Gans' main criticism of the Nielsen system is that it isn't sophisticated enough; but he never questions his unstated premise that culture is—or ought to be—"user"-determined, as if cultural needs were nothing more than a kind of collective itch, to be "stroked" through the proper marketing techniques.

And although he concedes that "in real life, culture is not, cannot, and should not be created by such systematic planning procedures," and even goes so far as to admit that "novelty and surprise are essential qualities of all art and entertainment, both for creators and audiences, and research cannot provide them," there is little reason to believe that Gans thought that he was wasting his time in utopian fantasy by writing a book which asserts both the possibility and the desirability of such "programming."

So the pod-people are alive and well, in this latest reincarnation of the Cultural Commissars. But what popular culture needs is less fellow-travelling, and more critical understanding. □

The Talkies

by Benjamin Stein

The Godfather-Part II

Do you think you have a lot of willpower? Are you willing to be considered a nonconformist? Are you willing to be considered a freak even? You are? Then don't see *The Godfather-Part II*.

When I finally went to see GF-II, as its fans call it, two teenage girls in front of me were mixing screwdrivers while the show went on. They kept it up through the whole three and a half hours, and I think they really got something out of the time. I wasn't as lucky.

The movie is the biggest fraud since Homestake Oil Drilling, and a hell of a lot more money and people are involved. You would do better to contemplate murder for three and a half hours than to see GF-II. It is simple-minded, boring, pretentious, and dull. So that you won't feel too bad about missing it, here is one of its more memorable moments:

The Godfather, a vicious, brooding, sulking slimeball of a man, is told by his lovely Nordic wife ("Kay") that she had an abortion rather than have his child. "It was an abortion," she says. "Just like our marriage is an abortion, an evil, unholy, dirty thing." GF-II was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Screenplay Adapted from Another Medium. What could the "Other Medium" have been? Gruel?

Al Pacino, who plays GF, spends most of the movie staring at the ground with a burning Camel cigarette in his hand. Occasionally he whispers and sometimes he shouts. Sometimes he even speaks Italian. Once (when he is told about the abortion), his lower lip quivers. He is playing the role as if he were on Chlorpromazine. When he is threatening someone he says, "If you do not do this, I will be very...disappointed," Pacino was nominated for Best Actor.

Now here's a part for those of you who like subtlety. At almost all times when the GF appears, he is in a darkened room. He doesn't like the light, see, and all that darkness is supposed to show how he operates sort of out of the power of darkness and fear. There are about two hours of darkness in the film so the message gets across.

Another clever, subtle moment: the GF is sitting on the sundeck of a pre-Castro Havana hotel (acutely uncomfortable in the sun) with a number of other hoods. They are talking with a leading gambling hood named Hyman Roth (obviously patterned after Meyer Lansky) about dividing up the gambling casinos in Cuba. Just then, because it is Roth's birthday, a waiter comes out with a big birthday cake with a map of Cuba on it. Roth slices up the cake, thus slicing up the map of Cuba, and gives pieces of it to the racketeers. That's director Francis Ford Coppola's understated way of telling us how the gringos were carving up Cuba and exploiting it before Castro.

In case all this subtlety gets to be too much and the audience gets confused or loses interest, Coppola has a brilliant way of keeping our curiosity alive. For about the first two hours of the film, Coppola has the GF mumble whenever he is talking to his henchmen, so that we can't hear what he is saying to them. Then, when people start getting strangled and cut up, we don't know how come. People all over the theatre are nudging their neighbors and asking, "What's going on?"—everyone curious about whether any of those mumbles has anything to do with the killings.

The Godfather-Part II cuts back and forth between the story of the new God-

father, Al Pacino, and the stuff he is doing in 1958, and that of the original, GF-II's father, who was brought lovingly to life by Marlon Brando in the original *Godfather*. Only Brando wouldn't play in the sequel, so we get to see the young original GF being traumatized in his native Sicily, fleeing to America, and becoming a killer and a racketeer, circa 1918.

Never in the whole history of Hollywood movies which glorify killing and crime have murder and crime been so glorified as when we see the original GF start his climb to gangster top dog. If you don't see it, it is hard to believe that a camera could linger so lovingly on one man putting a pistol in another's mouth and pulling the trigger.

The film would be much less of a loss if it actually glorified crime. After all, there can be a certain bravery involved in crime, a daring and ambition which propel men from rags to riches. But unfortunately, the loving shots of murder are the high points of the film. Most of GF-II shows already rich and powerful people killing and torturing other people more or less just for the hell of it.

It is in this respect that GF-II is fundamentally different from the original *Godfather*. The latter, a lengthy soap opera of crime, at least gave some credit for toughness and initiative. It showed murderous people who were killing for motives we could understand, even if we did not share them. It showed people with some verve and personality that we could admire. But GF-II shows us people who are essentially no more than subhuman automatons, who kill because it is part of their nature. It shows us a society beyond hope of redemption—thoroughly rotten and deserving of destruction. Indeed the movie is a virtual paradigm of nihilism—"conditions in a social organization so bad as to make destruction desirable for its own sake independent of any constructive program or possibility." The fundamental nature of men and women in GF-II is so murky and evil that no amelioration of the human condition is possible.

Even that, however, could have been presented interestingly, and it wasn't. For the Academy Award for the Emperor's New Clothes—Francis Ford Coppola. □

Brudnoy's Film Index

■ **At Long Last Love:** At long last schmaltz, the dead-weighting of 16 wonderful old Cole Porter songs, as mauled by Burt Reynolds, Cybill Shepherd, and Madeline Kahn, among the major perpetrators. A clunky old-timey "comedy" dying by the minute; love, lust, and hijinks among the well-to-do and would-be *riches,* and some lovely art deco sets to redeem it from utter worthlessness. What a lovely party *this* is?

■ **A Brief Vacation:** Vittorio De Sica's last film, a languid, often insipid peek into the life and hard times of a woman convalescing in an Italian sanitarium: her dawning awareness of the oppression of men and factory life; her fleeting romance with a dreamy young idealist; her resignation to the fates. Florinda Bolkan is a delight to see, but the story is very old hat, and the viewer's mind wanders.

■ **The Four Musketeers:** They're back, the kid with his undersized britches and his busy sword, this time rounding out the Dumas classic with much less humor and more seriousness than *The Three Musketeers* of last year. Faye Dunaway excels as the evil Milady, with Charlton Heston's Richelieu and Christopher Lee's Rochefort rounding out the baddie brigade. Michael York, Oliver Reed, Richard Chamberlain, and Frank Finlay buckle their swashes with the best of them in this delightful sequel.

■ **Funny Lady:** La Streisand returns as Fanny Brice, still mooning over the nauseating Nicky Arnstein (Omar Sharif) but now marrying Billy Rose (James Caan), who in real life was about 3'4" but in Caan's exuberant incarnation is Mr. Biceps on a spree. Some of the song and dance shticks are marvelous, the comedy routines are wonderful, the sets are splendid, but the tear-jerking goes on and on, Sharif's dreamy-eyed routine palls, and Caan is ghastly as the brilliant impresario and mini-bully, Billy. Next, *Funny Grandma?*

■ **The Great Waldo Pepper:** An adventure film with heart, depth, insight, and caring. Robert Redford in his best role in years, portraying a 1920s flying ace trying desperately to hold onto the old way of flying as derring-do, at a time when the airplane's promoters were pushing to make it a safe, reliable mode of transportation. Comedy, tragedy, frolic, and some of the finest aerial scenes in the movies.

■ **Janis:** Joplin, called Pearl by her pals, the Texas kid, died young. She lives again here, in a first-rate documentary incorporating much of her music and not too much of her inane interviews. Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose—she said, and she lived that life, and American pop music is the poorer for her absence. It is the sixties resurrected, a touch of history, and a wealth of talent and, yes, offbeat grace.

■ **Shampoo:** He's gonna wash them gals right into his bed. And he—George (Warren Beatty)—sure does. He's a hairdresser, a heterosexual hairdresser no less, and his service is, well, verrry personal. Much confusion with his various affairs, hopping from spitcurl to blow-dry to bed, and getting out just in the nick of time. Jack Warden plays the urbane fellow whose wife, daughter, and mistress all get a piece of George's action. The ladies—Julie Christie, Goldie Hawn, and Lee Grant—are lovely, Beatty is Mr. Macho with a hotcomb, and except for the fact that the flick goes nowhere, it is great fun. There's one absolutely delicious scene on election night '68, and a few campy numbers elsewhere, but that's about it.

■ **Tommy:** The Who's rock opera magnificently filmed by the bizarre Ken Russell. This is a morality tale, a massive putdown of fashionable religious cults, a tale of love unrequited too. An explosive, devastating, sometimes brilliant musical extravaganza, the very epitome of contemporary music properly transformed to a sustained film. With Ann-Margret and Oliver Reed as the parents, Roger Daltrey as Tommy, and Elton John, Jack Nicholson, the divine Tina Turner, and many others in supporting roles that positively blast off the screen. Unimaginably powerful—if you like rock music.

■ **Les Violons Du Bal:** French director Michael Drach's reminiscence of the Nazi occupation of France, with Marie-Josée Nat and Jean-Louis Trintignant. An intelligent, controlled, biting movie about the will to survive, smoothly examining both the Jewish struggle to escape the Germans, and the French compliance and occasional resistance to their oppressors. It is on a par with last year's remarkable *Lacombe, Lucien,* both in theme and in mastery of the material.

■ **The Wilby Conspiracy:** A perfectly witless, utterly improbable story of racism in today's South Africa, with Sidney Poitier as the noble black and Michael Caine as his reluctant—but of course noble—white accomplice. The sinister made silly, the worthy made weird, the complexities of contemporary race relations dwindled down to a precious few black-white good-bad simplisms. A mighty bomb. □

Minerva and the Magicians

Readers of intellectual magazines know Thomas Molnar for his regular contributions on topics of politics, history, and economics. Professor of French literature at Brooklyn College and Adjunct Professor of Intellectual History at Long Island University, Molnar is also known for his many books in philosophy and political thought—among them, *The Decline of the Intellectual* (1961) and *Utopia, The Perennial Heresy* (1967)—and he is presently at work on a study of the concept of authority in the West. Readers who come upon his latest book, *God and the Knowledge of Reality*, will therefore recognize in its author a commitment of a special sort.

Stated throughout this latest work, that commitment has been "to save history from the grip of doctrine and to save philosophy from the destructive *hybris*." By "philosophy," Molnar means the unending human quest for reality, which in the West has developed into a specific philosophic mode from which our civilization has taken its main insights. If the philosophic mode is distorted, therefore, its impact on Western civilization is not long in coming. Philosophy plays an interpretive role in the West which in other civilizations is primarily performed by myth or religion. That is not to say that Western philosophy is divorced from religion, because in fact Molnar is persuaded that philosophy is either theocentric or it is, put simply, bad philosophy. The manner in which we perceive a supreme being, the way by which the divine reality is known, is a principal problem of philosophy, a problem which Molnar calls the "God-problem."

Epistemologically, Molnar sees three fundamental "positions" on the "God-problem," and he elaborates them in the first part of this book. One position is that God is inaccessible (Position A), a position taken for the most part by the Gnostic movement of the first, second, and third centuries in our era. This position fundamentally reduces the divine reality to an unknown utterly transcendent being which cannot be properly the object of philosophy. As such it is anti-philosophic in tendency and texture, reducing human knowledge of the divine to the level of "secret" knowledge possessed by those who have the arrogance to assert that they possess such information. Another position which Molnar sees is that which argues that God is immanent (Position B): that is, that man himself is God, an aspect of the divine consciousness, as Hegel and the German Idealists believed; or that there is no God, but man is as good a god as we need, a strain associated with Feuerbach and sometimes called "atheist humanism." The position which Molnar himself holds (Position C) is that God is neither inaccessible nor immanent, that God is transcendent *and* personal, a formulation which recognizes that the difference between man and God is a difference of kind, not of degree. Man is not God, nor is God so externally inaccessible that he cannot be known by man in rational fashion. Molnar writes that the statement " 'God is personal' means that he is knowable and accessible to man but is not identical with him." To this reader Molnar seems to be arguing in favor of a view of God which is conventionally associated with the chief monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and is thus attempting to recover a philosophic mode rooted in the religious experience of those religions. In Part Four of this work, "The Possibility and Limits of Knowledge," Molnar outlines the foundations of such a philosophic perspective, and Part Three, "The Ideal Society as the Framework for Absolute Knowledge," is an excursus on the political implications of contemporary subjectivist philosophy which Molnar earlier traced to its roots in a denial of God as transcendent and personal.

God and the Knowledge of Reality

by Thomas Molnar
Basic Books $10.00

It is unfortunate that in Part One Molnar uses the particular manner of identification of positions on the "God-problem" that he does, because the novice Molnar reader will certainly have difficulty keeping them straight in his mind. But it is also unfortunate that Molnar refers to these alternative theological perspectives as "positions" or "postulates." If the human mind can know extramental reality, then the act of knowing reality is not a "position" or a "postulate" because those terms connote on the one hand that the assertion that there is reality is irrational, and on the other that the conception of the existence of reality is willful, independent of any real knowledge. Molnar himself rejects such a connotation. Quoting Eric Voegelin, he writes, " 'In historical reality, a philosopher's truth is the exegesis of his experience: A real man participates in the reality of God and the world, of society and himself, and articulates his experiences by more or less adequate language symbols.' " This being the case, Molnar might have distinguished A and B as "positions," that is, willful decisions to ignore important features of reality, from C as something other, a term for which has yet to be coined. Indeed, this is what he attempts when he speaks of true and false mysticism, and true and pseudo-philosophy.

There are other problems, however, which his division of the "God-problem" into three positions entails. Not the least is Molnar's argument, after having shown their differences, that positions A and B are essentially identical. Though to the Gnostics the true God was inaccessible, he was believed to be accessible after a process of purification occasioned by the acquisition of the special knowledge (*gnosis*) that man is God. If God is immanent, however, one is merely saying that same thing, that one's true self is God. Molnar writes, "The nucleus of positions A and B is the divinity of the soul, although in one case this is assumed of it at once, in the other case, only after it has ascended to its 'true home'." Because they are at their base the same positions, Molnar has difficulty finding typical representatives. He can't quite fit Meister Eckhart or Spinoza into either A or B. But also because of the vastness and extent of the materials he has examined, Molnar tends to lump some doubtful examples into inappropriate categories. For example, is the Sumerian creation epic (*Enuma elish*) really representative of the position that God is inaccessible? My own reading in this field indicates that the notion of the hidden God occurred in ancient Egypt, not in Mesopotamia, and then it was not similar to the hidden God of Gnosticism, but rather to the hidden God of the Gospels.

These problems are probably the necessary product of Molnar's admitted attempt to move from contemporary philosophy and its distortion into a new mode. To engage in the pursuit of truth by means of writing books on the philosophic endeavor necessarily involves one in a perplexing flow of confusing and conflicting information. Yet from out of this morass, Molnar has accomplished a feat of substantial proportions.

In Part Two, Molnar makes a particularly cogent analysis of the contemporary philosophic dilemma, by way of his focus on Hegel as the prime intellectual representative of the assertion that the soul of man is divine. Part Two is divided into three sections: "The Magic Way to Perfect Knowledge"; "The Philosopher's Magic Quest"; "The Philosopher's Absolute Being and Absolute Knowledge." Those readers familiar with the recent essay by Eric Voegelin, "On Hegel—A Study of Sorcery," (*Studium Generale* 24: 335-368) will know the thrust of this section of Molnar's work. Both Molnar and Voegelin argue that if one studies the history of philosophy in the West independently of the simultaneous development of magic, alchemy, theosophy,

Gnosticism, and Neo-Platonism, one will miss entirely the substance of the chief intellectual movements in contemporary philosophy. Thus, Molnar classifies as "magic" the aspiration in modern philosophy to change "the heterogeneities of the universe into a homogeneity, a way of transmuting the being of things into a new being." He is suggesting that we should recognize the sentiment in modern philosophy that reality is unacceptable, and that the philosopher's purpose, what Molnar calls his "magic quest," should be to modify the constitution of being. The variety of utopian aspirations which have literally wrought havoc with Western political order since the French Revolution, including the rise of National Socialism and the Communist movement, he argues, are historical extensions of medieval alchemical and religious experiments which wrought havoc in the medieval world (for a complementary analysis, see: Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*; J.L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*; Ernest Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation*). In German Idealism, especially, one finds a "philosophic" reworking and fine-tuning of the old alchemical and Gnostic apparatus into a full-blown intellectual system which, with Hegel, seeks to divert the philosophic enterprise from the love of knowledge and become real knowledge. By "real knowledge" Hegel meant the actualization of the divine in his own system. But to aspire to construct such a system was in itself to become like God, a goal which is at the basis of the modern project, that is, to find a final solution, the ultimate reconciliation of the contradictions of existence.

It is the classical-Christian teaching, of course, that any such reconciliation is not possible within the limitations of political existence. Molnar draws this conclusion from the analysis of his subject, and does so persuasively. Philosophy is not an endeavor by which we take upon ourselves the role of God in the affairs of man. It is the condition of being in which we perceive reality as it is, and attempt to convey that consciousness to those who wish also to know. □

Book Review/Mary Jo Doyle

Nothing Happens

Something happened, but it didn't happen to Bob Slocum. It happened to Joseph Heller. Sometime during those 13 long years he spent writing *Something Happened*, he lost his faith in the ability of man to overcome catch-22 and all the other inane systems by which he is forced to live.

In his powerful novel, *Catch-22*, Heller showed that man could survive midst the myriad inconsistencies of the so-called institutions. Yossarian fought, he kicked back at the system, and then he ran. "I'm not running away from my responsibilities, I'm running to them. There's nothing negative in running away to save my life." Yossarian is infinite. He had learned the lesson of Snowden: "Man was matter. The Spirit gone, man is garbage." And, having learned it, he refused to allow his spirit to take refuge in nonexistence.

In Yossarian we saw spirit defying the rot of the body, but in Slocum we see only the garbage, the ruin. In Slocum, Heller has personified the stink of rancid decay.

While Yossarian battled hypocrisy in a military situation, Heller has placed Slocum in the day-to-day business world which most of us face. Instead of the daring rebel he once gave us, Heller now gives us a snivelling slob. Slocum is the epitome of the middle class. He has a home in the suburbs, two cars in his garage, a middle-of-the-road position in his corporation, and even two and two-thirds children (one child is mentally handicapped, and therefore Slocum does not consider him a "whole" human being). But, despite the fact that Slocum exists in the same bureaucratic absurdity as Yossarian, he is the embodiment of inactivity and indecision. Throughout his lengthy, repetitive and very boring narrative, Slocum recreates events in his life in which positive action was necessary for survival of the spirit. In each chapter he deals with a segment of this life (his work at his office, his wife, his children, and his own image of himself), but instead of triumphing over the physical wasteland he portrays, he sinks deeper and deeper into the muck of the absurd.

In the beginning of his account he tells us that he is "powerless to decide." He is unable to make decisions which will positively affect himself or his family. He tells us repeatedly that he and his family and the people with whom he works are unhappy. "I've got bad feet. I've got a jawbone that's deteriorating and someday soon I'm going to have to have all my teeth pulled. It will hurt. I've got an unhappy wife to support and two unhappy children to take care of. I've got eight unhappy people working for me who have problems and unhappy dependents of their own. I've got anxiety." The people in Slocum's life want someone to take command and reinforce their commitment to life.

Something Happened

by Joseph Heller
Knopf $10

Finally, in the last chapter, Slocum takes command, but only because he has given in to the system. In doing so, he has perpetuated the absurdity. Slocum has not accepted his responsibilities; he has merely learned to hide behind them. "Nobody knows what I have done. Everybody is impressed with how bravely I've been able to move into Kagle's position and carry on with the work of organizing the convention. No one understands that carrying on bravely was the easiest thing to do." To carry on seems to be the best thing to do, but it is merely a continuation of the system. Slocum is incapable of affirmative action to save himself. Heller has failed to recreate Yossarian's spirit: a spirit which can conquer the physical matter of man.

As a black humorist in *Catch-22*, Heller proved that man's spirit could survive in an absurd universe if he were willing to accept the fact of the absurdity, laugh at

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it, and then create his own rules by which to live. In the beginning of the book, for example, Yossarian is in an Army hospital with "almost jaundice." He knows that "if it became jaundice they could treat it. If it didn't become jaundice and went away, they could discharge him. But this just being short of jaundice all the time confused them." Yossarian, however, is not confused at all. He knows that the hospital is the safest place to be during the war, so he doesn't intend to be released.

While Yossarian chooses to stay in the hospital instead of going back to the war, Heller does not allow Slocum any kind of rational choice. Slocum never understands or accepts the fact that the world in which he lives is absurd. Hence, he spends his entire life looking for explanations of sequences that have no logical basis.

His premise is that something happened sometime to make him what he is. In an absurd world, however, that premise is false. Nothing happened that really mattered in one way or another. Hence, Slocum looks for solutions which are inaccessible, if not altogether nonexistent.

Perhaps the best contrast between Heller's affirmative black humor and his new negative approach can be seen in Slocum's inability to fight back at a world which has denied him hope of a satisfying existence. In *Catch-22,* Yossarian continuously defied the system. His running away from it was simply another form of defiance. He knew he was incapable of changing the status quo; so he left to find a more rewarding existence for himself.

Slocum wants to fight, but his spirit isn't strong enough to justify action. He repeatedly tells the reader that he wants to hurt those who intensify the anguish of the absurd. ("My daughter makes me feel foolish again. And again I have that powerful, momentary, spiteful impulse to injure her, wound her deeply with a cutting retort, to reach out over the dining room table and smack her hard on the side of the face or neck, to kick her viciously under the table in her ankle or shin. I can do nothing though, but ignore her."(But, physical activity leaves him limp. ("I would lose all energy and soul and be left with almost no substance I could feel.") He is unable to perform physically or emotionally when he is brought face to face with decisive activity. Hence, he merely becomes another hollow man who whimpers.

Slocum's first line in *Something Happened* is "I get the willies." And, after reading his entire narrative, I've got the willies. Heller once was able to create an antihero with whom I was pleased to identify. Yossarian had an undying spirit that proved that he and, hence I, could retaliate in some way against the inconsistencies of absurdity. If nothing else, we could laugh at the ludicrous atrocities.

Slocum, however, is merely a shell of that fighting spirit. He doesn't laugh at the absurdity; he only giggles at his own inanity.

And what about Heller? Does he too giggle and get the willies now? I hope not. I hope that *Something Happened* was just a temporary sojourn in the world of nihilism, and that in 13 more years he will give us another wonderful novel which reasserts his faith in the power of man to overcome the mundane through affirmative action of the spirit. □

EDITORIAL
(continued from page 4)

sensibility of the electorate. The sensibility of the average American has suffered an enormous amount of abuse in recent years as the critics have debonairly bludgeoned him for being a militarist or a dullard or whatever else might service their short-term polemical purposes. The critics act as though a democratic electorate is a giant tuba, capable of playing any tune the critics blow into it, once minor adjustments are made. I doubt the American electorate is so adaptable. In fact I doubt that any democratic electorate is, at least in matters of foreign policy.

Over a century ago Tocqueville assayed the disrelish democracies have for the conduct of energetic foreign affairs, and students of American history have long noted this tendency amongst Americans. Only since the Second World War have Americans inclined toward a global foreign policy. Before that Americans focused on their domestic problems and raised George Washington's farewell advice first to folk wisdom, thence to dogma. A citizenry can only endure so much confusion before it reverts to the simplest credos, and I suspect that if the pounding of their sensibilities continues Americans will stagger back to the simpler truths of isolationism. Already they are edging in that direction. If this continues, the critics of American foreign policy are going to be performing before empty seats when they attempt to turn the State Department into an international equivalent of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare—which is probably the essence of any genuine reform they might suggest. The intellectual critics of American policy are themselves too pretentious to be isolationist. They have vast international designs for what they would call "cooperation" with the Third World and even the Communist world. Nevertheless, if Americans revert to their pre-1941 position, Mr. Schlesinger and his associates are going to have a difficult time shipping pharmaceuticals and grain to the new governments of Southeast Asia.

Alas, I fear my reflections cannot end here with happy visions of Secretary of State Arthur Schlesinger vainly exhorting 210 million baseball fans to chip in for a system of junior colleges for the idealists of modern Indochina. Unfortunately we live in a world inhabited by greedy militarists and aggressive totalitarians, and as the first half of the century made clear, democratic nations do not fare very well in diplomatic jousts with militarists—not when their citizens are looking inward.

The third decade of this century bears a riveting similarity to our present trials. Winston Churchill called the thirties the locust years and those years reveal the grave difficulties democracies face in dealing with aggressive militaristic regimes. In such circumstances democracies tend to act without resolution, without wisdom, and occasionally without honor. When Nazi Germany disregarded the Treaty of Versailles and militarized the Rhineland, the French vacillated and the British actually rushed out to sign a naval agreement allowing Germany naval tonnage in excess of that which both nations had agreed to in the 1919 treaty. From that point on, as Germany knocked off one weak neighbor after another, the democracies stammered and looked for the fire escape. When the Italians snatched Ethiopia the members of the League of Nations shrieked and swooned, but they recognized the Italian conquest. Through it all a grim axiom emerged: the successes of aggressive militarists encourage more militarists. In the Far East General Hideki Tojo grew in stature and ambition.

Meanwhile the Americans were living through a period of blissful isolation and the American Congress was immobilized by partisanship. During most of the decade only neutrality legislation could get through Congress, as Arthur Schlesinger from an earlier incarnation astutely observed. A fascination with pacifism swept American campuses just as it had swept English campuses, and native American isolationism intensified with the country's growing economic weakness. Disillusionment with Wilsonian idealism turned American intellectuals toward the kind of introspection that has captured our own aging subjects of Camelot. America in the 1930s was at one with the Britain Churchill observed: "This was one of those awful periods which recur in our history, when the noble British nation seems to fall from its high estate, loses all trace of sense or purpose, and appears to cower from the menace of foreign peril, frothing pious platitudes while foemen forge their arms." As the news of the day makes poignantly clear, we are now very close to an embodiment of Neville Chamberlain's England, and to add to the bleakness of our ordeal there is no Churchill to deride.

Our military involvement in Indochina was not a wise policy, not from a strategic standpoint and certainly not in the way it was executed. But once Mr. Johnson's commitment had been made there re-

(*continued on page 35*)

"Whom the gods destroy, they first make mad." —Euripides

Current Wisdom

RĒCHAUFFĒ: Madame McGrory, old bulbous nose, reveals how far her wit has advanced since 1964:

Most of the members of the Republican National Committee, unlike their brothers and sisters of the Conservative Conference who met there several weeks ago, are recognizable politicians. The conservatives are theologians, whose roots are in the Spanish Inquisition. The slightest deviation from their orthodoxy sends them out gathering wood for the auto dafe [sic].

—*Chicago Tribune*
February 1975

FREUD AND BOZO: Where else will you find the arcane arts of psychoanalysis applied to American politics other than in the eminent *Nation*, a journal of political occultism:

If politics stops at the Atlantic shore it has never done so at the Pacific. Since 1950, partisan politics—not the politics of open free debate on alternative policies but the politics of blackmail and scapegoating—has had disastrous consequences for American policy in the Pacific. It began with the false Republican charge that the Democrats had "lost China." Coupled with redbaiting and a national witch hunt, this charge so unnerved the Democrats that they felt compelled to demonstrate their military *machismo*—with consequences in Korea, Indochina and Taiwan that still haunt us. As a result, we lost not China but contact with the Chinese for two decades.

—*The Nation*
April 5, 1975

MAU-MAUING THE CLODS: While arguing against the injustice of pay television Mrs. Dorothy Height, president of the National Council of Negro Women, sounds a well-used alarum:

While some children would be boasting of the shows they saw or the games they watched on their Pay-TV sets, the less fortunate would have one more reason to hate and to face the realization that they are not equal.

—*The Public Speaks about Losing Free TV,* brochure distributed by the National Association of Broadcasters

GOOD NEWS: The acute and remarkable *Nation* divulges why it is that the likes of Jane Fonda, Daniel Ellsberg, and Abbie Hoffman have gone scot-free:

Ehrlichman, advised by a new attorney, saw the light and asked that he be sentenced to serve out his term as legal adviser to the Navajos on their reservations. If the suggestion had been advanced a bit earlier, with a boost from the media, it might have won acceptance, for it is in the post-Watergate spirit and also in keeping with the prevailing ethic, in the sense that we do not jail those who have attended a university, who are white and socially presentable, and who are devoted to *laissez-faire* economics and have prospered under "the American system."

—*The Nation*
March 8, 1975

DELECTATIONS: Miss Bette Midler, current rage of the slob ambience, recalls an exquisite moment of French cuisine whose American equivalent is probably most closely approximated by the hog brain sandwich:

"I went to Paris, France, to become very elegant and I failed mis-er-ably. You know, I thought I spoke French. Then I got there and I realized I didn't. But I ate my brains out."

—*Newsweek*
April 14, 1975

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY: In this latest homily against America's political involvement in Vietnam, Mr. Tom Wicker resorts to an argument dripping with libertarian prejudices, cogent prejudices, prejudices as applicable to Vietnam as to HEW—so when will Mr. Wicker apply the lessons of Vietnam to our extravagant welfare state?:

Samuel Popkin, an authority on Vietnam but by no means a dove, thinks the problem was largely intervention itself. In simplified form, his complex argument is that an enormous investment of money and power, such as the United States made in Vietnam, was found to attract the sharpest and most opportunistic Vietnamese into competition for local control of such military, economic and political riches.

—*New York Times*
April 8, 1975

BELLES-LETTRES: *Ms.* magazine apprises its toney readers of a promising literary event:

To my knowledge, *Loving Her* is the first novel about an interracial lesbian relationship written by a black woman. Viewed as an artistic work, I think the novel fails. But in its exploration of a daring subject boldy shared (and written by a librarian at Fisk University) I think it has immense value. It enables us to see and understand, perhaps for the first time, the choices certain women have made about how they will live their lives, and allows us glimpses at physical intimacies between women that have been, in the past, deliberately ridiculed or obscured.

—*Ms.*
April 1975

A THEORY OF JUSTICE: A howl of hypocrisy, ignorance, bigotry, brazen inconsistency, artless contradiction, and storm trooper cruelty—the commonplace patter of a gentle soul dutifully performing virtue's tasks in the zany editorial office of *The Nation*:

If evidence were needed to sustain the proposition that criminal justice is the process by which in this country we attempt to discipline the lower-income groups—blacks, Chicanos, poor whites, and the so-called "criminal class"—it has been provided by the sentences meted out in the Watergate cases. With the exception of Gordon Liddy, the true believer, most of the defendants have received notably light sentences, considering the gravity of the offenses charged. The sentences given Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Mardian fall in this category. Moreover there is excellent reason to believe that none of these men will actually serve out the terms which Judge Sirica imposed. If their sentences are not later commuted, it is likely that President Ford will pardon them before leaving office. Even as they were being sentenced, former Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski voiced what constituted a plea for future leniency. "The length of time," he said, "is not the important thing. Rehabilitation is." What would be really important would be a demonstration that ours is a system of equal justice under law; that high government officials and corporate executives who commit major crimes should be treated more sternly in sentencing than, say, an illiterate man who has lacked opportunities to make anything of his life. This demonstration has been lacking in the Watergate cases.... The notion advanced by Mr. Jaworski that "rehabilitation" is the important thing in these cases is utter rubbish.

—*The Nation*
March 8, 1975

QUOTE-MISQUOTE: The only possible problem exhibited in the following learned quote from Mr. Warren Beatty, Hollywood's goody-goody genius, is that when the great man was reading Plato's *Apology* he thought he was reading Dostoevsky—the perils of a crash course in literacy:

"You try to tell the truth if you're trying to be an artist," he says, frowning. "You try to lead a life and you lead it. Dostoevski said that the unexamined life is not worth living. If you examine your life, and you live in Beverly Hills.... Obviously, if I didn't have strait-laced beginnings, I would have had to make 'Shampoo.' I wouldn't have to express what's in 'Shampoo.' If I didn't feel that I had to deal with my own hypocrisies, I wouldn't have had to do the film."

—*Washington Post*
March 13, 1975

correspondence

Edited by George J. Nathan

To the Editor:

I believe that I have not read any words so beautifully spoken and written, or so appropriately made, as those of the Solicitor General about his great friend, Professor Alexander M. Bickel (April issue).

One can see in those thoughts the rending sorrow which he felt at his death, and a colleagueship which must have contributed so much to the displayed genius of each man. I hope that the memory of Alexander Bickel will continue to provide a part of the chemistry found in the mind and work of former Professor Bork, and, much more, that it will sustain Mrs. Bickel and their children in the years which come.

Alexander Bickel was a friend of mine, and of other faculty members in the law school with which I am associated. Several of us had a substantial association with him, at various times over the years. It was an honor for me to work with him on three cases, and to discuss at some length the subject of law teaching.

Those were separate events, for another time. But they were a predicate, always it seemed, for discussion on that subject which concerned him most: the Supreme Court.

And they permit me to recall one of Alexander Bickel's unique abilities: his ability to define risk to an institution and show how to avoid it. And he combined this intellectual analysis with another element, almost as important to substantial reform, namely the platform for its expression. He knew, as his teacher Justice Frankfurter taught, that the Court (and several segments of the Federal Judiciary) has placed itself in significant, but still potential, danger. It may come if its conduct and positions become truly understood among the people of the United States, because then quite possibly its very independence may be at issue. I believe he wanted to avoid that perhaps above all else; as do many of us who called him a friend.

And so I looked upon him not only as a personal friend, but, at the time of his death, as possibly the most important person in American legal education. And that to me is a measure of what we have lost, and of the gap we must attempt to fill.

Thank you for publishing the Solicitor General's remarks.

William F. Harvey
Dean, Indianapolis Law School
Indiana University
Indianapolis, Indiana

To the Editor:

Who can help but approve of the estimable optimism exhibited by Mr. Neil Howe in his articles on the Thieu regime of South Vietnam! We are told by this sanguine observer that "freedom of press and speech has flourished, although the recent shutdown of five Saigon newspapers is an ominous sign."

This is the man we need to report on national news. We need, for example, to be told that "President Ford is finally beginning to restore an anti-inflationary fiscal sanity to the nation, although his $52 billion projected deficit is an ominous sign."

It would also be comforting to learn that "the latest strategic weapon negotiations promise to assure American military supremacy, although the provisions allowing the Soviets to exceed our hardware in almost every category are an ominous sign."

Or perhaps, "the departure of President Nixon from the national scene has given a great lift to Republican morale, although his expressed willingness to be of further service to the party is an ominous sign."

While in fairness I suppose these ominous signs must be noted, they of course detract little from the essential thrust of Mr. Howe's style of reporting. We need more of this kind of welcome news in this troubled age.

John McClaughry
Lyndonville, Vermont

The Editor comments: Neil Howe is not responsible for the sentence Mr. McClaughry praises. His reports were submitted before the shutdown, which called for some editorial emendation of his remarks. But it was our reporter's considered judgment, before the shutdown, that freedom of press and speech was flourishing in South Vietnam. The question, of course, is now academic, for freedom of press will never again be even an issue in South Vietnam.

To the Editor:

"Of Gimcracks" (A Recent Promulgation of the Food and Drug Administration):

The FDA decrees herein
That none shall warm their cold din-din
In ovens using microwave
Unless certain steps are taken to insure
that the hazards of excessive exposure
to microwave energy are effectively
minimized
Dally not by oven doors
Or sure you'll dally never more
For waves of micro can and do
Damage the eyes and reproductive organs
of consumers' bodies,
an FDA spokesman said yesterday.

James Grant
Brooklyn, New York

To the Editor:

I enjoyed the article on cigars. Bakshian was correct. Ibold's Black Peter is a great seegar. I prefer to read about something besides the goddam bars of Gotham in your Great American Saloon Series. Who gives a good drat. The serious drinker drinks alone. He doesn't need any inane chatter to drink. He drinks not because he enjoys it but because he has to.

W.J. Griffith
Sun City, Arizona

To the Editor:

I wish to congratulate Neil Howe for his excellent reportage from Vietnam. I do not remember having seen anywhere in the press a similarly many-dimensional yet accurate image of that country's recent past, present, and—let us hope—future. His two articles show an objectivity and a maturity that many a political science professor might emulate.

Thomas Molnar
New York, New York

To the Editor:

I was chagrined to read the morally self-righteous letter from Charles A. Lave cancelling his subscription to **The Alternative** because he disagreed with your "snide remarks" and because you allegedly "had so little respect for the rights of others." We often suffer the same slings of outrageous criticism from readers who are intolerant of our liberal humanist views.

I consider your journal to be a refreshing breeze of dissent against the current wisdom. I often disagree with you on a number of issues. Yet how important to have a conservative journal picking holes in our liberal assumptions. It is only by the exchange of conflicting opinions that you and we can come closer to the truth. You help to keep alive the spirit of skepticism so important to a free society. Right on!

Paul Kurtz
Editor, **The Humanist**
Buffalo, New York

Gentlemen:

This letter is to request the removal of my name from your mailing list.

Attached is the label from a recent issue.

Thank you.

Charles H. Percy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Percy:

In response to your letter of 15 April, we regret to inform you that we are unable to remove your name from our mailing list. Your label is number 27496 0276 K and is, as you can see, a K label, which cannot be removed from our computer list unless we can provide the computer house with a copy of Form 26-397-J, the "Official Removal Request Form." I enclose a copy of this form for your use.

I thank you for your interest in **The Alternative**, and look forward to hearing from you.

George Nathan

To the Editor:

Unfortunately, at any given time, a goodly proportion of American conservatives can be found with one or both feet in their mouths. Take yourselves a bit more seriously, and edit out such embarrassments as Raico's gratuitous reference to China as "that filthy anthill" (February 1975). Printing bigotry is one of the quickest ways to end the dialogue that you are trying to create.

Karen S. Sapolsky
Belmont, Massachusetts

EDITORIAL
(continued from page 32)

mained no recourse but to honor it. To think otherwise is to toy with the same fantasies that trivialized the diplomacy of Chamberlain and Daladier in the 1930s. I do not mean to imply that there was no room for diplomacy in Southeast Asia or that military tactics were the sole answer. But it is obvious by now that in dealing with militarists diplomacy is futile when not accompanied by military might. To think that a great nation, a nation whose strength insures the peace of so many points on the globe, can simply walk away from contested commitments, can renege on treaty agreements as though they had evaporated with time, or can cut back on defense expenditures in the face of competition from abroad is to mock history. To ignore the consequences of one's own policies, to patronize and deceive an electorate is to dangerously weaken a nation from within. To do all of the above is to tempt imminent disaster. The popinjays who have been chirping about the injustices and debacles of our postwar foreign policy and who are so delighted with the inaction of the poseurs of the 94th Congress, the Congress that is so extravagant at home and so parsimonious abroad, the Congress that abuses our NATO allies, ignores the Communist intrigues in Portugal, and refused to live by the implicit obligations of the Paris Agreement—the popinjays who see the whole post-Watergate period as a glorious episode would do well to recall Mr. Churchill's account of a similar episode in pre-war England. "It was easy to laugh off such an episode in England, but in Germany, in Russia, in Italy, in Japan, the idea of a decadent, degenerate Britain took deep root and swayed many calculations."

All around the world many calculations are being made today. The calculations began some years ago when our universities capitulated to radicals and to know-nothings, when social problems seemed to multiply, and when the old stability of American life began to fade. The calculations continue as a truly preposterous collection of men attempts to hobble our intelligence forces, return our troops from Europe, accommodate every vagary winging in from the Third World, and further debilitate our military. America has limited influence on the calculations of foreign powers, but I would suggest that America do what it can to influence those powers toward sober conclusions. For thirty years the best way to do this has been to present a united voice to the world on matters of foreign policy, maintain a strong military posture, honor foreign commitments, and act soberly ourselves. I see no reason to depart from such policies today, not when the critics can conjure up nothing more inspiriting than the policies of the 1930s. □

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